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Trial by jury is central in the thinking about criminal justice in
spite of the fact that very few felony cases are disposed of in that
manner.1 Important pre-trial decisions are influenced by the assumed
reactions of a hypothetical jury to particular facts.2 Instructions
foster abundant folklore3 and they are frequently selected as the
most likely source of error in criminal trials ;4 certainly, a substantial
number of the appeals decided each year by the Missouri Supreme
Court, and by appellate courts in other jurisdictions,, deal with such
errors.
Problems in this area fall into three groups: (1) evidence suf-
ficiency: whether there is sufficient evidence in the case to justify
giving a particular instruction; (2) misdirection: assuming an in-
struction is given and there is sufficient evidence to justify it, whether
it is a correct statement of the law; and (3) nondirection: assuming
an instruction is not given and there is sufficient evidence to justify
it, whether it is error not to give it.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the Missouri Supreme Court
cases which discuss the last of these issues, the circumstances which
1. Although statistics are not readily obtainable for Missouri, a representative
picture may be obtained from the disposition of felony cases in the Recorder's
Court, the trial-level court in Detroit, Michigan. In 1956, a total of 5,528 felony
cases were disposed of by that court, in which formal charges had been made. Of
this number, 289 were tried by a jury, 5.2% of the total. ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE
RECORDER'S COURT OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN 2 (1956).
2. Many decisions leading to non-prosecution of cases result from a determina-
tion that there is very little likelihood of a conviction because of past perform-
ances of juries in similar cases. Those statistics cited in note 1, supra, do not
indicate the large number of cases which do not even pass the charging stage--
the issuance of arrest warrants. Thus, e.g., in California in 1960, 28.5% of all
adult felony arrests resulted in release by the police even prior to any charging
decision being made by a magistrate or prosecutor. The use of the jury indicated
by statistics from California, however, are remarkably close to those cited for
Detroit. A jury was used in 7.5% of the total number of cases in which formal
charges were filed. See Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to
Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 11 (1962). It is not, however, suggested that
all dispositions prior to charging, or after charging but without trial by jury,
result from predictions about probable jury reaction.
3. "As one turns to the jury as a topic for basic study he is met with the
conflicting reactions that there is a poverty of usable legal theory and an abun-
dance of specific legal hypotheses to test.... How much can and ought jury
equity be controlled by formal rules of law and procedure?" KALVEN, REPORT ON
THE JURY PROJECT OF UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 6 (1955).
4. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 351 (1930); MISSOURI ASSOCIATION FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY 226 (1926); ORFimL, CRIIIuNAL APPEALS
IN AMERICA 206 (1939).
5. While the problem appears to be greater in Missouri than in most other
states, it certainly is not confined to Missouri. See ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 4,
and GREEN, op. cit. supra note 4.
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place a trial judge under a duty to give a certain instruction; par-
ticular attention will be paid to whether a request 6 by defense counsel
is needed and, if so, whether the request must correctly state the law.
Only felony cases are analyzed.7 It will always be assumed that there
was sufficient evidence to justify giving the instruction in question
and that defendant properly preserved the issue for appeal.8
The issues arise because a trial judge failed to give an instruction
favorable to a defendant who was subsequently convicted. For ex-
ample, defense counsel in a murder prosecution introduced evidence
which tended to show self-defense. He did not request an instruction
on self-defense although the evidence was sufficient to justify giving
it, and the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on his own initiative.
Should the failure to instruct be reversible error? Suppose, on the
other hand, the defense counsel requested such an instruction, but the
law as stated in the request was not correct. How should this affect
the trial judge's duty to instruct?
I. THE MISSOURI RULE
The most important decision expressing the Missouri rule, State '.
Chaney,9 attracted a majority in the Supreme Court only because of
its particular facts. Since a majority of the court did not express
approval of the "accepted" rule,10 it is desirable to examine all sug-
gestions and attempts at resolving the problem it raises.
6. "Request" was defined recently in State v. Harris, 356 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo.
1962) : "A 'request' for an instruction consists of preparing and presenting to the
court a written instruction with the request that it be given." See also State v.
Martin, 364 Mo. 258, 260 S.W.2d 536 (1953). In State v. Michael, 361 S.W.2d
664 (1962) the court said "the trial court is not to be convicted of error for failing
to draft in its entirety an instruction on a collateral issue pursuant to an oral
request as was made in this case." Id. at 666. The defendant had orally requested
the instruction but did not prepare a draft for the court.
7. Most of the rules relating to the giving of instructions in felony cases are
purportedly based on Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.070 (1959) which does not apply to
misdemeanors. See text accompanying note 11 infra. See also State v. Griffin, 289
S.W.2d 455 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
8. Often the failure to give an instruction does not lead to a reversal on appeal
because the defense did not satisfy the procedural prerequisites. See cases cited
in State v. Burrell, 298 Mo. 672, 252 S.W. 709 (1923).
9. 349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961).
10. Defendants were jointly charged and found guilty of robbery in the first
degree and their appeals were consolidated. During the trial the defendants pre-
sented an alibi defense. On direct examination defendant Chaney's girl friend
testified that Chaney was with her at the time of the robbery. Through the use
of prior inconsistent statements made to the police, the prosecutor on cross-
examination was able to elicit facts that were highly prejudicial to the defendants
and destroyed the alibi defense. The court refused to give defendants' offered
instructions by which they sought to limit the jury's consideration of the girl's
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A. THE STATUTE
All appellate opinions since 1879 deciding the issues under discus-
sion purport to rest on the Missouri statute, which provides:
Whether requested or not, the court must instruct the jury in
writing upon all questions of law arising in the case which are
necessary for their information in giving their verdict; which
instructions shall include, whenever necessary, the subjects of
good character and reasonable doubt; and a failure to so instruct
in cases of felony shall be good cause, when the defendant is
found guilty, for setting aside the verdict of the jury and grant-
ing a new trial .... '11
B. STATE V. CHANEY: PRINCIPAL OPINION
In addition to reliance on the statute, there has been a pervasive
tendency to establish four verbal categories, with differing legal con-
sequences, to subsume the particular instruction under one of those
categories, and thereby to reach a conclusion. This approach was
testimony on cross-examination to judging her veracity as a witness, the defen-
dants wanted it made clear that the jury was not to use that evidence to determine
their guilt or innocence. A divided court reversed and remanded the case
because of the trial court's failure properly to instruct the jury.
Hyde, C. J., delivered the principal opinion in which Westhues and Hollings-
worth, JJ., concurred; Storckman, J., concurred in the result in a separate opin-
ion; Dalton, J., concurred in the result; Eager, J., dissented in a separate opinion;
Leedy, J., dissented.
11. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 546.070 (1959). See also Mo. Sup. CT. RuLE 26.02. The
statute had its origin in the language of an early Missouri case, Hardy v. State,
7 Mo. 607 (1842). Defendant was convicted of operating a roulette wheel. The
trial court had informed the jury that they were the judges of the law and had
allowed them to take to the jury room a law book from which they were to ascer-
tain the law applicable to the case. Holding this reversible error, the court said:
It is the duty of the judge of a criminal court . . . to instruct the jury in
all the law arising in the case, and it is the duty of the jury to respect the
instruction of the court as to the law of the case .... Id. at 609.
The statute was first passed in 1879. It was amended in 1889, Mo. RaV. STAT.
§ 4208 (1889), to make failure to instruct good cause for granting a new trial.
Sherwood, J., intimated in State v. Clark, 147 Mo. 20, 47 S.W. 886 (1898) that this
provision resulted from what he believed to be the erroneous holding in State v.
Brooks, 92 Mo. 542, 5 S.W. 257 (1887) that it was not reversible error to fail to
instruct the jury on the effect of an extra-judicial confession unless requested by
the defendant. An 1895 change (Mo. Laws 1895, p. 161) added "the subjects of
good character and reasonable doubt" to its requirements. This amendment is
at least partially attributable to the holding in State v. Murphy, 118 Mo. 7, 25
S.W. 95 (1893) where the court refused to reverse for failure to instruct on the
subject of good character when not requested by the defendant. It was amended
again in 1901 (Mo. Laws 1901, p. 140) to add the phrase "whether requested or
not." The statute has remained unchanged since that amendment.
Mo. Ray. STAT. § 546.380 (1959) makes it clear that the court may instruct
even when there is no duty to do so, provided that issue has arisen in the case.
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followed by the principal opinion in Chaney. The following categories
have been established.
1. "Law of the Case" or "Main." The result of an issue falling
under this classification is that a failure to instruct on it will be
reversible error whether an instruction has been requested or not.
The authority for the result which follows the label is the statute and
the case-law it codified.
2. "Collateral." When an issue is denominated "collateral," it will
not be error for the trial court to fail to instruct on it on its own
motion. But if the defense requests an instruction on a "collateral"
issue, the trial court must give a correct instruction even though the
request submitted by defense counsel may have been erroneous. The
authority for the result which follows this label is case law.
3. "Converse." Instructions on behalf of the defendant which state
what the jury shall do if it does not find those facts required by the
state's instructions are denominated "converse." The court is under
a duty to give such an instruction only if defendant submits a cor-
rectly worded instruction accompanied by a request that it be given.'2
The authority for this is case law.
4. "Cautionary." No error can be predicated on failure to give a
cautionary instruction on the trial court's own motion or, apparently,
where the instruction requested is erroneous. The authority for this
proposition is weak and it may not be followed in all cases. In
Chaney, the court said that "giving purely cautionary instructions,
which may be discretionary with the court, should require the offer of
a correct instruction . .. "1
C. STATE V. CHANEY: CONCURRING OPINION
It is rare to find a Missouri case which does not use these categories
in stating its decision. However, two other theories are occasionally
suggested judicially. The concurring opinion in State v. Chaney urged
that there be only two categories of instructions:
Either the instruction in a felony case involves questions of
law with reference to which it is necessary to inform the jury in
arriving at its verdict or it does not. If it does, then under §
546.070 (4) the trial court must give a proper instruction whether
requested or not; the statute is mandatory. If it does not, then§ 546.380 controls and the duty is, or should be, upon the de-
fendant to request an instruction in proper form before he can
claim error. The giving of such an instruction would be discre-
12. This is also limited by the type of state instruction involved. The rules are
further developed in the section dealing with converse instructions, infra.
13. State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Mo. 1961).
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tionary or nonmandatory. I can see no sound reason for making
the right to an instruction depend upon the happenstance of a
defendant submitting a written request although erroneous. 14
This opinion reached the same result as the majority opinion; the
issue in question-limiting the effect of impeaching evidence-fell
within the mandatory class and hence it was error to fail to instruct
on it. Under this approach, however, it was immaterial that the
defense in Chaney had requested an incorrect instruction, and the
result would have been the same had there been no request at all.
14. Id. at 246. Prior authority for this position may be found in State v. Foster,
335 Mo. 577, 197 S.W.2d 313 (1946). The concurring opinion also agrees with
the statement in State v. Weinberg, 245 Mo. 564, 150 S.W. 1069 (1912):
What questions are necessary for the information of the jury and upon
which a failure to instruct will be a good cause for a new trial, and what
are questions upon which an instruction may properly be given but which
a failure to give will not entitle the defendant to a new trial unless proper
instructions are requested, have not been definitely pointed out by this court.
Indeed, it might be difficult to make such a distinction as would be applicable
in all cases and inadvisable to attempt it. Id. at 575, 150 S.W. at 1072.
It would seem from this opinion that all those instructions which the majority
would consider collateral, and therefore which give rise to a duty to instruct
thereon only in the event of a request-correct or erroneous-, would constitute
those cases in which the court must instruct without a request. The concurring
judge said:
I see no merit in a legal principle which requires the trial court to give
a correct instruction on a so-called collateral matter simply because defense
counsel has requested an improper one. It is not based on the controlling
statute and is subject to abuse. If the subject matter of the instruction
offered is of such importance that the court must redraft and give one in
correct form, then it seems to me that it is a matter necessary for the infor-
mation of the jury within the meaning of the statute and that the court
should be required to instruct on it whether a written request is made or not.
State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238, 248 (Mo. 1961).
This rule would be further limited since the concurring opinion expressed the
view that the circumstances of the case may be controlling so that a general rule
could not always be laid down in advance of the case in which the issue is raised.
A similar view was expressed by the court in State v. Worten, 263 S.W. 124
(Mo. 1924):
Despite the presence of that fetish of the common law which we dignify
by the term of "precedent," the tendency of the courts, especially in the con-
sideration of criminal cases, is to sustain errors assigned, only when it
appears that they are prejudicial to the substantive rights of the accused.
Id. at 127.
That doctrine, of course, is a double-edged sword. Kennish J., reversing for
failure to instruct despite the failure of the defense to satisfy procedural require-
ments for preserving the point for appeal, said:
[I]f satisfied from the record that there has been a failure to instruct thejury upon a question which goes to the fundamental rights of the defendant
and that by such failure injustice may have been done or a verdict returned
different than if such failure had not occurred, this court in the interest ofjustice will not hesitate to grant a new trial, though the question be pre-
sented here for the first time. State v. Conway, 241 Mo. 271, 292, 145 S.W.
441, 448 (1912).
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D. STATE V. CHANEY: DISSENT
A third view was expressed in the dissenting opinion:
While I agree with the analysis of our prior cases as made in
the principal opinion, I believe that the rule reaffirmed therein
is causing and will cause much uncertainty in the trials of crimi-
nal cases, and that it puts the burden in the wrong place. The
complexity of the situation is shown by the various classifications
discussed in the principal opinion. I do not believe in changing
the law for the sake of change or to demonstrate some phase of
advanced thinking, but I do conceive it to be our duty to change
rule of nonstatutory law, procedural or substantive, when we
are convinced that it is basically wrong. The various classifica-
tions as made, with very hazy delineations, can only tend to
bewilder the trial judges and lawyers; I believe that the principle
now reasserted does more harm to the public interest than any
possible good which it may do for defendants. I would require the
defendant to offer a correct instruction on all matters which he
desires to have covered except those prescribed in § 546.070 (4),
before reversing.15
This approach, reversing only for failure to instruct on the minimal
requirements of the statute (if, indeed, it does not limit even more
than that), would seem to indicate some doubt in the mind of Judge
Eager as to the efficacy of instructions. To the extent that the opinion
is predicated on such a view, it is contrary to the basic assumption
governing this area of the law.'8 This is not to say, however, that
such a rejection is not supportable; it simply has not yet been sup-
ported by any empirical study of the assumption that juries are
governed in their deliberations by the instructions. 17
But, ordinarily, even in cases when the court has taken considerable
time to discuss various ramifications of the decision, still recourse is
had to the four-part division. For this reason, it can be said that the
court has generally utilized the same language in its opinions. But a
similar consensus is often lacking when the actual holdings of the
cases are considered. This results from conflicting opinions of two
15. State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238, 249 (Mo. 1961).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Malinsky, 153 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
where the court said that it must be assumed and presumed that juries follow
instructions.
It is also possible to construe the language of the dissent to be in accord, in
principle, with the concurring opinion. This is so if the phrase "those [matters]
prescribed in" the statute is read to mean not just reasonable doubt and good
character, but the law of the case generally. Under such construction the con-
curring opinion and the dissent differ only as to the category in which the instruc-
tion-limiting the effect of impeaching evidence-should be placed.
17. Such a study is now being undertaken at the University of Chicago, under
the guidance of Harry Kalven, Jr. Kalven, REPORT ON THE JURY PROJECT OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL (1955).
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types: (1) disagreement about which particular instructions belong in
which of the categories; and (2) disagreement about the legal con-
sequences of the categories denominated "collateral," "converse," and
"cautionary," especially with reference to the effect of a request.'8
II. THE LAW RELATING TO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS
The purpose of this part of the note is to examine the specific in-
structions most often involved in appellate litigation. Despite fre-
quent disagreements as to the proper classification of particular in-
structions, there is generally enough consensus to allow this material
to be organized on the basis of the verbal categories, i.e., law of the
case (or main), collateral, converse and cautionary.
There is one exception to the general utilization by the court of
these categories: word definition instructions are in a generically dif-
ferent class from the others. The rules applicable to definition in-
instructions depend upon the particular word involved and usually
the categories are not relied upon. Rather, the problem is resolved
in terms of "technical" vis-a-vis "ordinary" words. Therefore, those
instructions are discussed separately.
A. DUTY TO INSTRUCT WITHOUT REQUEST-"LAw OF THE CASE."
1. Reasonable doubt and lpresumption of innocence. No contrary
authority exists to the proposition that it will be error to fail to in-
struct that the defendant may not be convicted unless the jury finds
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, whether this instruction is re-
quested 9 or not.20 Although the statute was amended in 189521 to
include the subject of reasonable doubt, the court had already reached
this result by construction of the old statute, so the amendment was
declarative of existing law.22 Since the instruction must be given even
when not requested, a fortiori it must be given when it is erroneously
requested.2 3
18. An example of this may be seen in the fact that the Supreme Court in
Chaney decided the case on the issue of what the legal effect of being "collateral"
was, while the state argued on appeal that, inter alia, the instruction involved was
actually cautionary, not collateral. Brief for Respondent, p. 27, State v. Chancy,
349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961). In the respondent's supplemental brief, however, the
denomination was changed to "collateral or cautionary."
19. State v. Fannon, 158 Mo. 149, 59 S.W. 75 (1900); State v. Clark, 147 Mo.
20, 47 S.W. 886 (1898) ; State v. Gonce, 79 Mo. 600 (1883).
20. State v. Gullette, 121 Mo. 447, 26 S.W. 354 (1894).
21. Mo. Laws 1895, p. 161.
22. See, e.g., State v. Gullette, 121 Mo. 447, 26 S.W. 354 (1894) (apparently
not requested) ; State v. Gonce, 79 Mo. 600 (1883) (requested).
23. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 147 Mo. 20, 47 S.W. 886 (1898).
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After 1895, the statute provided that instructions "shall include,
whenever necessary, the subjects of good character and reasonable
doubt. 12  But the court had previously held in State v. Gonce
25 that
an instruction must be given "even though it may appear to the court
there can be no grounds for a reasonable doubt. '2 6 Thus, the reason-
able doubt instruction is an important exception to the general rule
that instructions need only be given when put into issue by sufficient
evidence. It is true the amendment was subsequent to the holding
that such an instruction must be given in any event; nonetheless,
since the amendment was declarative of existing law, presumably
the Gonce case is still correct. An instruction on the subject of reason-
able doubt is substantially, if not exactly, the same as an instruction
on the presumption of innocence ;27 therefore the requirement is satis-
fied if the court instructs on either of these subjects.28
2. Good Character. When the issue of defendant's good character
is raised, either by defendant 29 or by the state,30 the court must inform
the jury of its evidentiary value, whether or not the defendant re-
quests the instruction. While this instruction was made mandatory
by the same amendment to the statute that included reasonable
doubt,3' it was not a codification of existing law.3 2 Rather, it has been
24. Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.070 (4) (1959). (Emphasis added.)
25. 79 Mo. 600 (1883).
26. Id. at 603.
27. See, e.g., State v. Gonce, 79 Mo. 600 (1883), where the court quotes with
approval the following instruction:
The burden of proof to establish the guilt of defendant devolves upon the
State, and the law clothes him with a presumption of innocence which at-
tends and protects him until it is overcome by testimony which proves his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... Id. at 602. (Emphasis added.)
28. In State v. Douglas, 258 Mo. 281, 167 S.W. 552 (1914), it was held not
to be error to fail to instruct as to the presumption of innocence if the court fully
charges as to reasonable doubt. See also State v. Gregory, 170 Mo. 598, 71 S.W.
170 (1902). The effect of these and many other similar cases is that the court
need not instruct on any subject which has already been adequately and fairly
covered in other instructions. Thus, this instruction is an exception to the rule
that no instruction need be given unless put in issue by the evidence but is not
an exception to the rule that an instruction need not be given on an issue already
covered.
29. See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 7 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1928).
30. In State v. Baird, 288 Mo. 62, 231 S.W. 625 (1921), the court adverted to
the fact that the state had deliberately attempted to attack the character of the
defendant, but the evidence elicited showed a good character. It was held that the
state was not in a position to argue that the question of defendant's character was
not in evidence and the case was reversed for failure to instruct on this issue.
31. Mo. Laws 1895, p. 161, added good character and the phrase "whether
requested or not" was added by Mo. Laws 1901, p. 140. See also State v. Lindsey,
7 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1928).
32. Prior to the amendment, it was generally held not error to fail to instruct
on this issue when erroneously requested or not requested at all. State v. Nickens,
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said that a case holding to the contrary caused the amendment.3 It
seems clear that the issue was considered to be collateral by most
judges prior to the amendment.3 4 Thus, it is placed in the anomalous
position of being the only "collateral" issue which must be instructed
upon whether requested or not.
3. Elements of the offense charged. Surprisingly few cases have
actually held that elements of the offense charged are part of the law
of the case, but it is clear that this is the rule.3 - The instructions,
therefore, must always include those elements. Perhaps the relative
122 Mo. 607, 27 S.W. 339 (1894) (not requested); State v. Murphy, 118 Mo. 7, 25
S.W. 95 (1893) (not requested); State v. McNamara, 100 Mo. 100, 13 S.W. 938
(1889) (erroneously requested); State v. Nugent, 71 Mo. 136 (1879) (not re-
quested; contra, State v. Swain, 68 Mo. 605 (1878) (it is possible that the instruc-
tion as requested was correct but the court did not place the opinion on that
ground).
33. Sherwood, J., attributed the amendment to the holding in State v. Murphy,
118 Mo. 7, 25 S.W. 95 (1893) where the defendant did not request the instruction
and the court on appeal refused to reverse.
34. At the time most of the decisions involving this issue were decided, there
was considerable conflict as to the effect of being denominated collateral. Appar-
ently there existed at the same time two different rules as to the effect of an
erroneous request. But the cases which refused to reverse because the instruction
requested was substantially wrong were following the rule that as to collateral
matters, the defendant must request the instruction correctly. Thus, the court in
State v. McNamara, 100 Mo. 100, 13 S.W. 938 (1889) called the instruction
collateral, but refused to reverse because the request was not correct. This would
not be the rule today even apart from the statute if the issue is in fact collateral.
The nature of this instruction was stated by Sherwood, C. J., in State v. Swain,
68 Mo. 605, 615 (1878):
The object of the introduction of evidence respecting good character, is the
improbability that a person of good character would have committed the
offense alleged against him, and to lay such evidence before them with the
purpose of inducing belief that either mistake or misrepresentation has
occurred on the part of the prosecution.
35. State v. Gale, 322 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1959); State v. Webster, 230 S.W.2d
841 (Mo. 1950) (reversed for failure to instruct on the defense that defendant in
good faith sold the hogs at his father's request which would destroy the intent
element of the charge of larceny) ; State v. Decker, 321 Mo. 1163, 14 S.W.2d 617
(1929) (entrapment); State v. Conrad, 322 Mo. 246, 14 S.W.2d 608 (1928)
(dictum); State v. Harris, 267 S.W. 802 (Mo. 1924) (lack of intent in larceny);
State v. Mullins, 292 Mo. 42, 237 S.W. 502 (1922) (error to fail to inform thejury that the misrepresentation necessary in a prosecution for obtaining property
under false pretenses is misrepresentation of an existing fact-defendant dis-
charged); State v. Matthews, 20 Mo. 55 (1854) (lack of intent in larcey). In
State v. Gale, supra, the charge was under Mo. REv. STAT. § 560.156 (1959) the
so-called "stealing" statute. Section 3 thereof provides:
If the property stolen within the meaning of subsection 2 is a chattel and
the person charged with stealing the same proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that no further transfer was made, and that, at the time of the
appropriation he intended merely to use the chattel and promptly to return
or discontinue his use of it, he has a defense to a prosecution under sub-
section 2.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss3/5
FELONY INSTRUCTIONS
paucity of cases in this area derives from two facts: one of the
earliest cases in Missouri dealt with that issue and has not been
seriously questioned since ;36 secondly, "law of the ease," taken liter-
ally, is certain to include a definition of the offense charged.
For the most part, those things which are elements of the offense
charged are obvious. However, one is not: the Missouri court has held
that instructions on entrapment come within the law of the case
category.3 7 The reasoning of the Missouri court was, in essence, that
if the defendant was entrapped, he could not be found guilty; there-
fore, absence of entrapment must be an element of the offenseA8 What-
ever is thought of the reasoning, this issue must be instructed on
whether requested or not, but, unlike other "elements," only when it is
put into issue by the evidence.
4. Lesser included offenses. Offenses which might be found by the
jury on the evidence and which constitute lesser included offenses are
law of the case and must be instructed upon whether requested 39 or
not.4 0 This instruction is analogous to that defining the elements of
36. State v. Matthews, supra note 35.
37. State v. Decker, 321 Mo. 1163, 14 S.W.2d 617 (1929).
38. The court said in State v. Decker, supra note 37, at 1170, 14 S.W.2d at 620:
The law of the case comprehends the elements of the offense charged, as
shown by the evidence. Entrapment was one of the elements of the offense,
for, if defendant was entrapped, he was not guilty, as we have shown.
This apparently was on the theory that the entrappers actually committed the
"offense" and that defendant was an aider and abetter. Since the jury could not
find the officers guilty, defendant could not be guilty as a principal in the second
degree. See also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) where two
theories are discussed: (1) the requirements of highest public policy in the main-
tenance of the integrity of administration require the courts to prevent such
prosecution (concurring opinion); (2) the legislature did not intend enforce-
ment in such cases (majority opinion). If the defense is construed as being
predicated on legislative intent, then it could theoretically be considered an
"element" of the charge in all cases where supported by the evidence.
39. State v. Nicholas, 222 Mo. 425, 121 S.W. 12 (1909) (degrees of larceny);
State v. Young, 99 Mo. 666, 12 S.W. 879 (1890) (grades of homicide).
40. State v. Watson, 364 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. 1963) (common assault under charge
of felonious assault); State v. Smart, 328 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1959) (man-
slaughter); State v. Davis, 328 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. 1959) (manslaughter); State
v. Taylor, 309 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1958) (manslaughter); State v. Craft, 338 Mo.
831, 92 S.W.2d 626 (1936) (robbery without a dangerous and deadly weapon and
grand larceny) ; State v. Enochs, 339 Mo. 953, 98 S.W.2d 685 (1936) (petit lar-
ceny); State v. Johnson, 6 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1928) (manslaughter); State v.
Connor, 252 S.W. 713 (Mo. 1923) (manslaughter); State v. Liolios, 285 Mo. 1,
225 S.W. 941 (1920) (murder second degree); State v. Conley, 255 Mo. 185, 164
S.W. 193 (1914) (fourth degree manslaughter); State v. Hoag, 232 Mo. 308, 134
S.W. 509 (1911) (common assault in charge of attempting to rape); State v.
Palmer, 88 Mo. 568 (1886) (different degrees of murder); State v. Banks, 73 Mo.
592 (1881) (murder second degree); State v. Branstetter, 65 Mo. 149 (1877)
(manslaughter). Contra, State v. Ray, 225 S.W. 969 (Mo. (1920) (dictum which
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the offense charged; in a sense, each lesser included offense which the
evidence will support is "charged" since the jury is authorized to con-
vict therefor."
5. Joinder of Burglary and Larceny. It is the duty of a court to in-
struct on all of the possible verdicts when the defendant has been
charged with both larceny and burglary, whether requested
2 or not.43
Presumably, this would also apply to other instances of joinder, but
specific authority is lacking for that proposition. This instruction is
similar to that for "lesser included offenses," except that in the pres-
ent case the defendant may be found guilty of both, whereas, by
definition, he may not be found guilty of both a lesser included offense
and the offense alleged.
6. Joinder of defendants. The court has held that failure to instruct
the jury that they may convict one defendant and acquit the other,
or find both of them guilty, or find both of them not guilty, involves
the law of the case, so a trial court is in error if it fails to instruct
on this issue regardless of a request by the defense."4 The issue is
similar to the two preceding ones; all three relate to possible alter-
native verdicts of the jury.
was later refuted in State v. Crowley, 345 Mo. 1177, 139 S.W.2d 473 (1940));
State v. Coleman, 186 Mo. 151, 84 S.W. 978 (1905); State v. Brewer, 109 Mo. 648,
19 S.W. 96 (1892) (the defense did not satisfy procedural requirements so that
the statement may be regarded as dictum).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. § 556.220 (1959) provides:
Upon indictment for any offense consisting of different degrees, as pre-
scribed by this law, the jury may find the accused not guilty of the offense
charged in the indictment, and may find him guilty of any degree of such
offense inferior to that charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to com-
mit such offense, or any degree thereof; and any person found guilty of
murder in the second degree, or of any degree of manslaughter, shall be
punished according to the verdict of the jury, although the evidence in the
case shows him to be guilty of a higher degree of homicide.
Mo. Rav. STAT. § 556.230 (1959) provides:
Upon an indictment for an assault with intent to commit a felony, or for
a felonious assault, the defendant may be convicted of a less offense; and
in all other cases whether prosecuted by indictment or information, the jury
or court trying the case may find the defendant not guilty of the offense as
charged, and find him guilty of any offense, the commission of which is neces-
sarily included in that charge against him.
42. State v. Brinkley, 146 Mo. 37, 47 S.W. 793 (1898).
43. State v. Lackey, 230 Mo. 720, 132 S.W. 602 (1910); State v. Hutchinson,
111 Mo. 257, 20 S.W. 34 (1892). Thus, for example, in State v. Lackey, supra,
it was error to instruct the jury that they could find defendant guilty of both or
neither, but failed to instruct that they could find him guilty of one or the other.
44. State v. Craft, 23 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. 1929); State v. Lambert, 318 Mo. 705,
300 S.W. 707 (1927). Contra, State v. James, 216 Mo. 394, 115 S.W. 994 (1909).
The court, in an early Missouri case, refused to reverse on this ground when the
instructions were not requested. However, the facts of that case make it distin-
guishable from the usual sequence of events. The trial court in State v. James,
supra, specifically requested the defendant's counsel to present any instructions
they might desire. The defense failed to comply. While recognizing that the
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7. Punishment. The amount of punishment that may be given by
the jury, both maximum and minimum, has been denominated law
of the case and therefore instructions on this must be given whether
requested or not.45 This is true despite the fact that the punishment
actually assessed by the jury was within the permissible range.4
Again, this issue relates to the function of the jury in reaching a
verdict, and, in a sense, it might be said to be an "element of the
offense"; it is, at least, part of the substantive law of the offense.
8. Self-defense. It is clear that when the defendant requests an
instruction on self-defense, the court must give the instruction, or
correct defendant's erroneous one.4 7 The requirement appears to be
the same with respect to the area of "imperfect" self-defense. 41 A
self-defense instruction must be given even though the court's atten-
tion is not specifically directed to that defense by a request.4 9 Some
cases have found reversible error in the court's omission to instruct on
the issue when it was raised by evidence presented by the prosecution
using defendant's extra-judicial statements.50 The rule has been held
to be the same even when such evidence is inconsistent with the de-
fendant's testimony and when specifically denied by him.51
The defense of self-defense in essence denies the existence of the
corpus delicti. 52 By definition there can be no murder if the homicide
court should instruct on this issue, the Supreme Court refused to reverse because
of the failure of the defense counsel to comply. No extended discussion of the
arguably erroneous result of this approach need be undertaken. Insofar as
the court held that no instruction on this issue need be given in the absence of
a request, it is overruled by State v. Craft, supra, and State v. Lambert, supra.
45. State v. Bevins, 328 Mo. 1046, 43 S.W.2d 432 (1931); State v. Duddrear,
309 Mo. 1, 274 S.W. 360 (1925).
46. State v. Bevins, supra note 45.
47. State v. Chamineak, 328 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1959); State v. Stone, 354 Mo. 41,
188 S.W.2d 20 (1945); State v. Turnbo, 267 S.W. 847 (Mo. 1924); State v. Goode,
220 S.W. 854 (Mo. 1920); State v. Bidstrup, 237 Mo. 273, 140 S.W. 904 (1911);
State v. Little, 228 Mo. 273, 128 S.W. 971 (1910). In State v. Bidstrup, supra, it
is clear that the defendant did not request the instruction in question.
48. State v. Moncado, 34 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1930); State v. Adler, 146 Mo. 18,
47 S.W. 794 (1898).
49. State v. Bidstrup, 237 Mo. 273, 140 S.W. 904 (1911).
50. State v. Stone, 354 Mo. 41, 188 S.W.2d 20 (1945).
51. State v. Bidstrup, 237 Mo. 273, 140 S.W. 904 (1911).
52. The defense has been codified in Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 559.040 (1959):
Justifiable homicide
Homicide shall be deemed justifiable when committed by any person in either
of the following cases:(1) In resisting any attempt to murder such person, or to commit any
felony upon him or her, or in any dwelling house in which such person shall
be; or
(2) When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of his or
her husband or wife, parent, child, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece,
master, mistress, apprentice or servant, when there shall be reasonable cause
to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great personal
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was committed because of a reasonable motive of self-defense. 3 Thus,
the lack of a motive of self-defense may be consideded to be a part of
the offense charged,"- although the burden of coming forward with the
evidence may be on the defendant. Viewed in this way, the defense
is clearly a part of the law of the case along with the more familiar
concepts of the elements of an offense. When self-defense can be
shown by the defendant, it may be said that no offense has been com-
mitted, just as, under the court's view, it may be said that when the
defendant can show entrapment, no offense has been committed.
9. Conclusions. Apart from the express statutory requirements, the
issues constituting law of the case may be classed as follows: (1)
substantive rules (including, according to the court, those concerning
self-defense and entrapment) relating to the definition of all of the
offenses for which the jury may convict the accused; (2) rules, which
the jury rather than the court must apply, relating to possible ver-
dicts arising out of multiple charges or against multiple defendants.
The Missouri Supreme Court has determined that it is reasonable to
injury, and there shall be reasonable cause to apprehend immediate danger
of such design being accomplished; or(3) When necessarily committed in attempting by lawful ways and means
to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully suppress-
ing any riot or insurrection, or in lawfully keeping or preserving the peace.
Special problems of evidence sufficiency arise in consideration of self-defense
issues. The court has several times said that the instruction need not be given if
the only evidence is incredible. This may occur when the defendant himself is the
only one who testifies to facts which would indicate the existence of such a
defense. Thus, e.g., the court held it not error to refuse to instruct on self-defense
when defendant had testified to that effect but four state's witnesses testified to
the contrary. State v. Webb, 205 S.W. 187 (Mo. 1918). However, the existence
of such a doctrine has recently been questioned in State v. Chamineak, 328 S.W.2d
10 (Mo. 1959). If the doctrine exists at all, it is usually denominated the doctrine
of evidence contrary to the physical facts. See cases cited in State v. Chamineak,
supra.
53. When the requisite actus reas and mens rea have been shown, motive may
still be determinative of guilt in a small number of cases. In a prosecution for
murder when it is shown that defendant intended to kill (mens rea) and com-
mitted the homicide (actus reus), motive will still be determinative. Self-defense
is the motive for the act and is a recognized defense. See generally, PERKINS,
CRImINAL LAw 721-22 (1957).
Missouri has acceded to this analysis. Considering the correctness of an in-
struction given on the part of the state, the court, in State v. Webb, supra note 52,
said:
In the instant case self-defense was assigned by the defendant as the sole
reason for the homicide. This, therefore, constituted the motive for the act.
•.. Self-defense being the sole motive, the jury, familiar, as we are author-
ized in presuming they were, with the meaning of words in ordinary use,
could not, under this instruction, have found that there was a lack of motive,
without at the same time finding that there was not sufficient proof of self-
defense .... It is true that, where an instruction on self-defense has been
given, as was the case here, one on motive is not necessary. Id. at 189.
54. This view is expressed in State v. Clary, 350 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1961).
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place the entire burden on the trial court with respect to those issues
by requiring it to instruct upon them whether requested or not.5 5 The
primary significance of this classification is that questions relating
to the use or weight of evidence are excluded.
55. One possible criterion for defining the category of cases in which an in-
struction is required without a request, i.e., the law of the case category, could
theoretically be found in the field of constitutional law. It is at least arguable
that a total failure to instruct the jury would render the trial process so mean-
ingless as to amount to a denial of due process of law. Obviously no such total
lack of instructions is likely to occur, but it is certainly possible that a state court
might affirm a conviction despite a failure to instruct on a substantive element of
a crime, and that a constitutional argument based on such an omission might be
made. An examination of federal cases reveals statements roughly equivalent to
the following:
The admissibility of evidence, the sufficiency of evidence, and instructions to
the jury in state trials are matters of state law and procedure not involving
federal constitutional issues. It is only in circumstances impugning funda-
mental fairness or infringing specific constitutional protections that a fed-
eral question is presented. Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d '798, 802
(4th Cir. 1960). (Emphasis added.)
See also Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427 (1943) ; Application of Faust, 202
F. Supp. 205 (E.D.N.C. 1962); Hammil v. Tinsley, 202 F. Supp. 76 (D. Colo.
1962); Davis v. North Carolina, 196 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.N.C. 1961); Draper v.
Denno, 113 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Lest too much be read into this kind of statement, some distinctions must be
made. Not infrequently an instruction in a state case--or its omission-has been
premised on a principle itself violative of the federal constitution. The best illus-
trations are two cases, both of which involve a state effort to make conduct crim-
inal which could constitutionally be made criminal only if a particular mental
element is present. In Wood v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 305, 141 P.2d 309 (Crim. Ct.
App. 1943), the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that the defendant was
guilty of criminal syndicalism only if he intended to engage in conduct which he
realized would lead to a clear and present danger to the existence of the govern-
ment. The conviction was reversed on the ground that the state was not free,
whether acting through its legislature or through its courts, to interfere with
the exercise of free speech by making utterances criminal in the absence of such
a mental state. Gitow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Similarly in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the Supreme Court inval-
idated a Los Angeles ordinance which had been interpreted as imposing liability
for possession of obscene literature on one who lacked knowledge of or a fair
opportunity to determine the obscene character of the publication. Again the
ground was that such a statute would indirectly inhibit freedom of speech and
the press. Obviously if a trial judge instructed a jury that they could convict
even though they believed that defendant was unaware of the obscene nature of
the publication and that he had no reasonable means of obtaining that knowledge,
that instruction would deprive the defendant of a federal constitutional right. In
that sense it is clearly true that federal constitutional rights, whether substantive
due process rights as in Wood and Smith, or procedural due process rights guar-
anteed by cases like Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), may be infringed via
the medium of incorrect or even omitted instructions, the relation between the
law of instructions and the federal constitutional law is fundamentally coinci-
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Because of the foregoing analysis, issues arising in several areas
require separate discussion.
a. Corroboration of the corpus delicti. An instruction in this class
has been placed in the collateral category and need not, therefore, be
given unless the court's attention has been directed to it.?' In State
v. Brooks, the majority of the court refused to reverse for failure of
dental. And it is in this light that the concluding sentence from the above
quotation must be read.
The duty to instruct on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof
in criminal prosecutions has been litigated in federal courts. In Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895), the Supreme Court reversed a finding of guilty in
a prosecution under federal law because of failure to instruct as to the presump-
tion of innocence even though the lower court had instructed on the subject of
reasonable doubt. The Court reasoned that the two instructions did not cover the
same subject matter. It held that the presumption of innocence is evidence in
favor of the accused introduced by the law in his behalf, and that reasonable
doubt is the condition of mind produced by the proof resulting from the evidence
in the case: one is a cause, the other an effect. This holding has been placed in
serious doubt by subsequent opinions. The court in United States v. Newman, 143
F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1944) said:
The charge as to reasonable doubt certainly covered the question as to the
burden of proof; and, if there still remains some mystic difference between
the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, it is at least im-
palpable enough to require an accused to bring the omission to the judge's
attention. Id. at 390.
See also United States v. Jonikas, 197 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1952). Further, there
is considerable doubt that such a rule was ever applicable to state trials. The
Court in Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) said:
Again, it is said that there was not due process, because the trial judge
refused to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence. He did charge
that the guilt of the accused must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that on a failure in this respect it was the duty to acquit. He also explained
what is meant by the term "reasonable doubt." The Supreme Court sus-
tained the charge. Of course, that is a decision of the highest court of the
State that in a criminal trial it is sufficient to charge correctly in reference
to a reasonable doubt and that an omission to refer to any presumption of
innocence does not invalidate the proceedings. In the face of this ruling as
to the law of the state, the omission in a state trial of any reference to the
presumption of innocence cannot be regarded as a denial of due process of
law. Id. at 136-37.
The duty to instruct on the punishment the jury was authorized to inflict has
also been litigated in the federal system. In Calton v. Utah, 130 U.S. 83 (1889),
the Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah because
of "fundamental rules obtaining in the trial of criminal cases involving life. Id.
at 87. There, the trial court had failed to inform the jury that they could recom-
mend life imprisonment at hard labor instead of the otherwise automatic death
penalty. While the Court did not rely expressly on the requirements of the sixth
amendment, a subsequent state case, Davis v. Texas, 139 U.S. 651 (1891), dis-
tinguished Calton v. Utah on the grounds that the latter "came directly to us
from the Supreme Court of the Territory." Further, Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) had held that the sixth amendment was applicable to the
Territory of Utah.
56. State v. English, 11 S.W.2d 1020 (Mo. 1928) (dictum).
57. 92 Mo. 542 (1887).
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the trial court to instruct the jury that defendant could not be con-
victed on his confession alone when the defendant had not requested
such an instruction. Judge Sherwood, dissenting in the strongest
possible language, contended that such an instruction must be given
whether requested or not-that it was part of the law of the case.
But his contention was recently reconsidered and rejected.5 8
The primary impact of the corpus delicti rule is to impose a mini-
mal requirement that evidence supporting all elements of the offense
be introduced before his confession is put into evidence against the
accused. It is therefore logical for the court to characterize it as col-
lateral rather than law of the case. Further, the fact that the effect
of the rule would be exclusion of evidence if the corpus delicti were
not proved does not provide a sufficient basis to distinguish it from
other rules of evidence. Discussion in a later part of this note-that
relating to collateral issues-will make it clear that other rules of ex-
clusion are also uniformly classed as collateral issues. Thus, despite
the strong position taken by Judge Sherwood, the court has refused to
denominate this issue law of the case.
b. Use of Force (other than self-defense). Force is often a factor
in situations other than that of pure self-defense. Thus, for example,
the court has held it error to refuse to give defendant's requested in-
struction that he had the right to use that amount of force necessary
to prevent sodomy from being committed on him.59 Most of the cases
in this area arose from refusals to give requested instructions.O It is
therefore difficult to tell whether the court is classifying the instruc-
tion as law of the case or collateral. When no request was made, the
court held it was not error to fail to instruct that the defendants had
a right to use sufficient force to subdue a mental patient,61 thus reject-
ing it as law of the case. On the other hand, the instruction has been
analogized to that of self-defense,62 which would seem to be more con-
58. State v. Truster, 334 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1960).
59. State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1959).
60. State v. Ford, 344 Mo. 1219, 130 S.W.2d 635 (1939); State v. Fielder, 330
Mo. 747, 50 S.W.2d 1031 (1932). In Fielder the court held that it was error to
refuse to give an instruction requested by defendant that he should be acquitted
if the jury finds that deceased was killed while defendant was defending himself
from an attack by others. The Ford case held it error to refuse the requested
instruction defining an officer's right to use force in arresting a person on a
misdemeanor charge.
61. State v. Herring, 268 Mo. 536, 188 S.W. 169 (1916). See also State v.
Groves, 194 Mo. 452, 92 S.W. 631 (1906). The court did not commit error in
failing to instruct on its own motion that defendant had a right to pursue one
who had taken his cap.
62. State v. Ford, 344 Mo. 1219, 130 S.W.2d 635 (1939).
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sistent, under the foregoing analysis, with a law of the case classifi-
cation.
c. Defense of Duress. That it may be a defense if defendant com-
mitted the crime because of a well grounded fear of present, immi-
nent and impending death or serious bodily injury must be submitted
to the jury in an instruction if the defendant so requests.03 The com-
mon law presumption of coercion when a married woman commits a
crime in her husband's presence is not changed by the Married Wo-
men Act." Thus, such an instruction, if requested, must be given in
favor of the wife when the facts fall within the ambit of the presump-
tion. However, in the latter situation, this defense has been called
"a rule of evidence" and is therefore collateral, so the instruction
under Chaney, must at least be erroneously requested. 5 Whether this
rule applies when the defendant shows that he or she was under ac-
tual, rather than presumptive, duress remains uncertain. Arguably
it would not. Where the defendant introduces evidence, no presump-
tion is involved. The defense may not be "a rule of evidence" under
those circumstances. It is nonetheless possible that the court will
classify the defense as collateral despite the fact that it is an affirma-
tive defense similar to self-defense.
d. Conspiracy. With regard to conspiracy, the court has said:
The [trial] court might very properly have instructed the jury
as to what was necessary to prove a conspiracy, and what might
properly be shown if a conspiracy existed, but the failure of the
court in that respect is not complained of. It was a matter
merely incidental and collateral, not an essential element of the
crime, and therefore nondirection in respect to it was not error.00
On another occasion, however, the court held that a conspiracy in-
struction must be given if one is requested. 7 Taken together, these
two holdings would seem to classify such instructions as collateral.
But it would also seem clear that if the state must rely upon a con-
spiracy theory, the instruction ought to be classed as law of the case
because it would define the elements of the offense charged.
B. DUTY TO INSTRUCT UPON ERRONEOUS REQUEST-"COLLATERAL."
1. Not evidence of guilt. The issues involved in this area generally
concern two types of evidence: that which is not to be considered by
63. State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953).
64. Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.290 (1959) as construed by State v. Murray, 316 Mo.
31, 292 S.W. 434 (1926).
65. State v. Murray, 316 Mo. 31, 42, 292 S.W. 434, 439 (1926).
66. State v. Kolafa, 291 Mo. 340, 348, 236 S.W. 302, 305 (1922).
67. State v. Simpson, 237 S.W. 748 (Mo. 1922).
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the jury at all, and that which, though it may be used for some pur-
poses, is not evidence of defendant's guilt. In both cases the defen-
dant may have a right to have the jury informed of the use to be
made, if any, of the evidence. However, the court must be requested
to give such an instruction.
Representative of those facts which are no evidence at all are the
following: (a) indictments; (b) defendant's refusal to testify; (c)
arguments of the prosecutor; and (d) involuntary confessions.
a. Indictments. The court has held that it was not error to fail to
instruct that an indictment is not to be considered by the jury when
the defendant had not requested such an instruction .6 However, since
no case has been found in which the instruction was refused, the actual
effect of a request is not known. The cases have used language broad
enough to imply that it might not be error to omit such an instruction
even when requested.69 Its inclusion in this section, then, is at best
argumentative.
b. Refusal to testify. The Missouri Constitution,70 a statute7 ' and
a Supreme Court Rule7 2 prohibit raising any presumptions from the
defendant's refusal to testify; such a refusal can be no evidence of
guilt. This rule has been construed by the court as meaning that the
defendant is not entitled to an instruction on his right to refuse to
testify even though it may be correctly requested,7 3 because it is pro-
vided that the failure to testify shall not "be referred to by any at-
torney in the case, nor be considered by the court or jury."74 The in-
clusion of this issue under "collateral" would therefore be problem-
atic were it not for two recent cases which adverted to the fact that no
proper request was made.7 5
c. Arguments of prosecutor. The rule that statements of the prose-
cutor are not to be considered by the jury as evidence has been
68. State v. Baker, 136 Mo. 74, 37 S.W. 810 (1896) ; State v. Donnelly, 130 Mo.
642, 32 S.W. 1124 (1895).
69. In State v. Donnelly, supra note 68, the court said it had "never held that
it was error to fail to instruct in this regard, as such an instruction could have
no possible bearing on any issue of law involved in a criminal case . . . [and]
could not in any way have affected the result of the trial." Id. at 648, 32 S.W.
at 1126.
70. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 19.
71. Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.270 (1959).
72. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 26.08.
73. State v. West, 356 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1962); State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 572,
178 S.W.2d 449 (1944).
74. This language appears in both the Supreme Court Rule and the statute,
notes 72 & 71, supra.
75. State v. Smith, 357 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1962); State v. Phillips, 324 S.W.2d
693 (Mo. 1959).
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classed as "cautionary" and will be discussed further under that
section.78
d. Involuntary confessions. The jury is entitled to pass upon the
voluntariness of a confession and to disregard it if it is involuntary."
Despite some early authority to the contrary,78 the rule is now well
established that, if defendant submits a correct or erroneous instruc-
tion on the voluntariness of his confession, the court has a duty to
correctly instruct on that issue.7 9
76. State v. Lindsey, 333 Mo. 139, 62 S.W.2d 420 (1933).
77. Note, The McNabb Rule and the Missouri Courts, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 93.
78. State v. Brennan, 164 Mo. 487, 65 S.W. 325 (1901); State v. Clump, 16
Mo. 385 (1852). In the Clump case, supra there apparently was no evidence to
suggest that the confession was in fact coerced. For this reason the court
denounced the requested instruction as the "enunciation of an abstraction." The
court in Brennan, supra, refused the "most unhappily worded" instruction. The
Supreme Court refused to reverse on that ground adverting to the fact that the
jury had already been instructed that it was for them to consider how much of
the defendant's statements as proved by the state was worthy of belief. Thus,
both cases can be distinguished and therefore are arguably not really contrary
authority.
79. State v. Aitkens, 352 Mo. 746, 179 S.W.2d 84 (1944); State v. Gibilterra,
342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938); State v. Moore, 160 Mo. 443, 61 S.W. 199
(1901). Further authority is found in State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo.
1961) which incorporated the statement of the court in State v. Bounds, 305
S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1957) that as to the subject of involuntary confessions, it was the
duty of the trial court to give correct instructions on the enumerated subjects
even though the instructions offered by the defendants were erroneous, citing,
inter alia, State v. Gibilterra, supra.
Conversely, if no request at all is made by the defendant, the court will not
commit error in failing to give the instruction on its own motion. State v. Truster,
334 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1960); State v. Francies, 295 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1956) ("col-
lateral"); State v. Herman, 280 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1955) ("collateral," but no
evidence supported the assertion in the motion for a new trial that the confession
was involuntary); State v. Martin, 260 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. 1953) (reversed on other
grounds); State v. Ramsey, 355 Mo. 720, 197 S.W.2d 949 (1946) ("purely col-
lateral"); State v. McCullough, 316 Mo. 42, 289 S.W. 811 (1926) ; State v. Cox
264 Mo. 408, 175 S.W. 50 (1915) ("cautionary" but this was dictum since it was
not preserved for review by raising the issue in the motion for a new trial);
State v. Simenson, 263 Mo. 264, 172 S.W. 601 (1915) ("collateral" in dictum).
See also State v. Lee, 361 Mo. 163, 233 S.W.2d 666 (1950) which was expressly
overruled by State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961) on another point but
which did call it collateral.
Although the court is not required to undertake to instruct on the voluntariness
of a confession unless requested to do so, if the court does undertake to so instruct,
it should cover the entire law on the subject, and should not omit therefrom,
as was done in the instant case, the question of whether or not the confession
was voluntarily given. State v. Sclnurr, 285 Mo. 74, 225 S.W. 678 (1920).
Thus, it was held error to instruct the jury on the weight that they may give to
statements made by the defendant against his own interest, unless the court then
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Issues involving evidence which may only be used for a limited
purpose by the jury include: (e) statements of a co-defendant; (f)
extra-judicial statements by witnesses inconsistent with their testi-
mony on trial; and (g) impeaching evidence.
e. Statements of a co-defendant. When one defendant has confessed
or made admissions, the other defendant is entitled to an instruction
limiting the effect of that evidence to the other defendant, but only if
he requests it.o
f. Extra-judicial statements by witnesses inconsistent with their
testimony on trial. Evidence of this type may not be used by the jury
to establish the guilt of the accused, and the court has held it error to
refuse to instruct on this point when defendant has requested it.,'
g. Impeaching evidence. It is error for a trial court to fail to in-
struct that impeaching evidence may be used only to impeach the wit-
ness, including the defendant himself, and not as evidence of guilt,
but only if the instruction is requested.8 2 The issue has consistently
been denominated collateral.
went further and required that the jury first find such statements or confessions
to have been voluntarily made. See also State v. Hancock, 340 Mo. 918, 104
S.W.2d 241 (1937); State v. Thomas, 250 Mo. 189, 157 S.W. 330 (1913).
80. State v. Sandoe, 316 Mo. 55, 289 S.W. 890 (1926); State v. Taylor, 261 Mo.
210, 168 S.W. 1191 (1914).
81. State v. Warren, 326 Mo. 843, 33 S.W.2d 125 (1930).
82. When not requested, not error: State v. Bozarth, 361 S.W.2d 819 (Mo.
1962) ; State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961) ; State v. Parker, 324 S.W.2d
717 (Mo. 1959); State v. Quilling, 363 Mo. 1016, 256 S.W.2d 751 (1953); State v.
Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1952); State v. Davis, 143 S.W.2d 244 (Mo. 1940);
State v. Headley, 18 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1929); State v. Simon, 317 Mo. 336, 295
S.W. 1076 (1927); State v. Miller, 292 S.W. 440 (Mo. 1927); State v. Broaddus,
315 Mo. 1279, 289 S.W. 792 (1926) ; State v. Aurentz, 315 Mo. 242, 286 S.W. 69
(1926); State v. Pfeifer, 267 Mo. 23, 183 S.W. 337 (1916); State v. Hobson, 177
S.W. 374 (Mo. 1915); State v. Douglas, 258 Mo. 281, 167 S.W. 552 (1914); State
v. Weinberg, 245 Mo. 564, 150 S.W. 1069 (1912); State v. Starr, 244 Mo. 161,
148 S.W. 862 (1912); State v. Rasco, 239 Mo. 535, 144 S.W. 449 (1912); State
v. Westlake, 159 Mo. 669, 61 S.W. 243 (1901).
When requested, error to fail to give instruction: State v. Chaney, supra; State
v. Starr, supra (dictum); State v. Swain, 68 Mo. 605 (1878) (instruction re-
quested was correct.)
For cases referring to "credibility of witnesses" generally, see State v. Drake,
298 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. 1957); State v. McPhearson, 92 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1936);
State v. Shuls, 329 Mo. 245, 44 S.W.2d 94 (1931); State v. Hardin, 324 Mo. 28,
21 S.W.2d 758 (1929) ; State v. English, 308 Mo. 695, 274 S.W. 470 (1925) ; State
v. Cunningham, 130 Mo. 507, 32 S.W. 970 (1895).
State v. Lee, supra, and State v. Sanders, 4 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1928) both held
that a request must be correct before the court would be under a duty to instruct
with respect to collateral matters and both cases were overruled by State v.
Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961).
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2. Weight to be given evidence. The instructions in this area are
intended to overcome some supposed predilection on the part of the
jury to misevaluate certain kinds of evidence. As in the preceding
section, the law is in doubt as to some of these issues.
a. Falsus in uno. Relatively few cases have dealt with an instruc-
tion on the effect of wilfully false testimony. The defendant may be
entitled to an instruction that if a witness wilfully falsified any ma-
terial part of his testimony, the jury is free to disregard his entire
testimony. But it has generally been stated that the giving of such an
instruction is entirely within the discretion of the trial court.8 3 On
the other hand, the court once said that it "would have been better
satisfied" if the trial court had corrected and given defendant's re-
quested instruction.84 In a recent case the issue was called "caution-
ary";-5 but still the court referred to the absence of a request, the
implication being that the issue might be classed as collateral.
b. Testimony of accomplice or co-defendant. While it is true that
a defendant may be convicted in Missouri on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of an accomplice,"" or even of a co-defendant, he is, neverthe-
less, entitled to an instruction informing the jury that such testimony
is to be received with the greatest caution. The issue has generally
been labeled collateral.8 7
c. Circumstantial evidence. In the absence of a request, the trial
court will not be in error for failure to instruct that in order to convict
on circumstantial evidence alone, the facts must be consistent with
each other and inconsistent with any reasonable theory of innocence.8
On the other hand, when the court is properly requested to give such
an instruction, it will be error to refuse.8 9
83. State v. Turner, 272 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1954); State v. Barnes, 274 Mo. 625,
204 S.W. 267 (1918); Wein v. State, 14 Mo. 95 (1849). In State v. Barnes, supra,
the defendant complained of the giving of the instruction rather than a refusal
to instruct.
84. Wein v. State, supra note 83 at 98.
85. State v. Turner, 272 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1954).
86. See, e.g., State v. Black, 143 Mo. 166, 44 S.W. 340 (1898) and cases cited
therein.
87. State v. Rutledge, 267 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1951); State v. Mansker, 339 Mo.
913, 98 S.W.2d 666 (1936); State v. Crow, 337 Mo. 397, 84 S.W.2d 926 (1935);
State v. Rowe, 324 Mo. 863, 24 S.W.2d 1032 (1930) ; State v. London, 295 S.W. 547
(Mo. 1927). But see State v. Weatherman, 202 Mo. 6, 100 S.W. 482 (1907) and
State v. Turner, 272 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1954) where the court denominated the
instruction "cautionary." See also State v. Crow, supra, where the court called
it both "cautionary" and "collateral."
88. State v. Turner, 272 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1954); State v. Allen, 235 S.W.2d
294 (Mo. 1950).
89. State v. Rawson, 259 S.W. 421 (Mo. 1924); State v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374,
14 S.W. 969 (1890). It is often pointed out by the courts that this instruction
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A more difficult question is presented when the instruction re-
quested by defendant is erroneous. No case has been found which
squarely holds that in the event of an erroneous request for an in-
struction on circumstantial evidence, the court must give a correct
one, but State v. Barton0 approaches this point of view. In Barton,
the instruction requested was not clearly erroneous, but the court
said it was "not a model by any means," and added, the "principle
having been expressly invoked by the defendant, the.., court should
have given a correct instruction on this point." Furthermore, Chaney
holds 1 that the court must instruct even though the request is errone-
ous if the subject matter of the request is denominated "collateral,"
and the weight to be given circumstantial evidence has been called
collateral. 2 The difficulty with that position, however, is that such
an instruction appears to be purely "cautionary" from the defen-
dant's point of view, and in one case it was called that.9 3 Nonetheless,
on the basis of the authority discussed, the issue is probably collateral.
d. Extra-judicial admissions made by defendant. Prior to the
Chaney case, the court did not always have to instruct on the weight
the jury was to give extra-judicial admissions made by defendant."'
Although, in State v. Hendricks," the court held that such an instruc-
tion must be given if at least erroneously requested, several cases sub-
sequently held that it was discretionary, even when requested.9 6 The
attitude of the courts at that time was set out in State v. Henderson:
[We] have often ruled that while an instruction may be called
for in some cases, and even error to fail to give it, it does not
necessarily follow it must be given in every case. Whether such a
cautionary instruction should be given must depend on the facts
developed in the case. Where the statements or admissions are
merely casual statements extending over a long time, or there is a
need not be given in any event unless the state rests its case entirely on circum-
stantial evidence. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 296 Mo. 427, 246 S.W. 883 (1922). This
is apparently true despite the jury's possible rejection of the direct evidence in
the case and total reliance by them on the circumstantial evidence.
90. 214 Mo. 316, 113 S.W. 1111 (1908).
91. State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961).
92. State v. Mansker, 339 Mo. 913, 98 S.W.2d 666 (1936).
93. State v. Singleton, 77 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. 1934).
94. Certainly this is true when there has been no request for such an instruction.
State v. Hampton, 172 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1943); State v. Mulconry, 270 S.W. 375
(Mo. 1925). See also State v. Evans, 324 Mo. 159, 23 S.W.2d 152 (1929) (oral
request not sufficient.)
95. 172 Mo. 654, 73 S.W. 194 (1903).
96. State v. Bobbst, 269 Mo. 214, 190 S.W. 257 (1916) ; State v. Smith, 250 Mo.
350, 157 S.W. 319 (1913); State v. Henderson, 186 Mo. 473, 85 S.W. 576 (1905).
In State v. Bozarth, 361 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. 1962) the court refers to the instruction
as "cautionary" and said the requested instruction was properly refused because
(1) it was wrong in substance; and (2) it was covered by other instructions.
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material variation between the witnesses, or the same conversa-
tion is differently narrated by different witnesses, or there is a
direct conflict as to the statements or admissions, or the circum-
stances are such as to indicate the witnesses may not have heard
all that the defendant said or were not in a position to hear all
that the defendant said, or considerable time has elapsed and the
memory of the witness may not be clear for that reason, then
the instruction... should be given if requested.9 7
The case held that the trial court did not err in failing to correct and
give defendant's requested instruction. Still later in Chaney,8 the
court said that:
[O]n the subjects set out in State v. Bounds"'... and other cases
herein cited and similar subjects, the principles of which are
applicable to the facts shown by the evidence in the case and to
the charges being tried, we hold that it is the duty of the trial
court to give a correct instruction if an instruction on the sub-ject is offered by defendant even though the offered instruction
is erroneous.
None of the subjects set out in Bounds dealt with the subject here
under discussion; however, State v. Hendricks was therein cited and
in that case the court held that the offered instruction should have
been given in a corrected form, even though the requested instruction
was properly refused as being argumentative. It may be that the
court in an appropriate case will require the trial court to give such
an instruction when erroneously requested.
The extent to which this rule will change the meaning of prior
cases is problematical. When the language of the Henderson case is
carefully read, it is seen that the court in large part was addressing
itself to the problem of the evidentiary basis for, rather than to the
pure question of the necessity of giving, a corrected instruction. The
court in State v. Smith said :10
It is true that when verbal statements of a defendant are cas-
ually made in the course of ordinary conversation, and form part
of the evidence, and it appears that such statements were made
on occasions more or less remote from the time when they were
disclosed, a cautionary instruction, such as is requested by de-
fendant, should be given as a corollary to the instruction upon
the weight to be attached to such verbal statements. This
rule, however, is not uniformly followed, and the present case is
one of the exceptions.010
97. State v. Henderson, 186 Mo. 473, 497-98, 85 S.W. 576, 583 (1905).
98. 349 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Mo. 1961).
99. 305 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1957).
100. 250 Mo. 350, 157 S.W. 319 (1913).
101. Id. at 372, 157 S.W. at 325.
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The court then found that the evidence did not support such an in-
struction. It is submitted, therefore, that if the rule is stated to in-
clude the requirement of sufficient evidence to support the instruc-
tion, the rule has been followed that the court will correct and give
an instruction on that subject. The Chaney case should not be read as
a blanket command to give such an instruction anytime there is testi-
mony reciting statements of the defendant. Only when the evidence
indicates the presence of those additional factors adverted to in the
Henderson and Smith cases, should an instruction be required.
e. Evidence of rape. In a prosecution for rape of a mature woman,
the defendant is entitled to an instruction telling the jury that the
failure of the prosecutrix to make a complaint soon after the alleged
assault is a factor they may consider, and the court will err in fail-
ing to give such an instruction when requested.10 2
f. Conflicting statements. A court does not err in failing to give an
instruction as to the conflicting statements of one of the state's wit-
nesses when it was not requested. The issue is collateral. 03
g. Defendant's testimony and deposition are competent evidence.
The instructions discussed above limit the strength of evidence against
the accused. The converse situation is sometimes presented by defen-
dant's request for an instruction informing the jury that they are not
to disregard certain evidence. In one case the court implied that it
was error for the trial court to fail to instruct that depositions are
good evidence and should be considered, 10' and, in another, that the
defendant is competent to testify.05 As on other collateral issues,
however, the defendant must request such instructions.
3. Inferences to be draum from the evidence. Several instructions
may be described as directing the jury's attention to the fact that
more than one inference is possible, particularly when the evidence
is conflicting. Some of these have been classed as collateral and some
as cautionary. In the latter category, the court found no error in the
trial court's failure to instruct on its own motion that a person other
than the defendant might have been guilty under the evidence.10 On
the other hand, in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated, it was
not error to fail to instruct, in the absence of a request, about the
possibility of defendant's condition being due to shock rather than
alcohol; the instruction was called collateral.107 The inference was
that it would have been error if it had been requested.
102. State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 174 S.W.2d 337 (1943).
103. State v. Bell, 359 Mo. 785, 223 S.W.2d 469 (1949).
104. State v. Albritton, 328 Mo. 349, 40 S.W.2d 676 (1931).
105. State v. Emory, 246 S.W. 950 (Mo. 1922).
106. State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945).
107. State v. Hurley, 251 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1952).
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Two other instructions of this type have been called collateral: alibi
and flight. Until recently the rule was that the court did not have
to give an alibi instruction on its own motion,108 but did if requested.1 9
The court recently held, 10 however, that alibi instructions are con-
verse insofar as the state's instructions require the presence of the
defendant at the scene of the crime, so the rules governing converse
instructions apply. By this the court apparently meant that the in-
struction had to be requested, but did not say whether the request
had to be correct. The instruction will be discussed in that section.
An instruction directing the jury's attention to defendant's ex-
planation of flight is a collateral issue, and must be requested.,
4. Conclusions. While the above discussion has not established the
proposition that issues concerned with evidentiary rules are co-
extensive with the class of "collateral" issues, it has shown that none
of the litigated issues involving the use of evidence, the weight to be
given to it, or the inferences to be drawn from it, are deemed to be law
108. State v. Harris, 356 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1962) ; State v. Hutchin, 353 S.W.2d
701 (Mo. 1962); State v. White, 301 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1957); State v. Brooks, 254
S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1953) ; State v. Johnson, 361 Mo. 214, 234 S.W.2d 219 (1950) ;
State v. Quinn, 344 Mo. 1072, 130 S.W.2d 511 (1939) ; State v. Trice, 338 Mo. 744,
92 S.W.2d 135 (1936); State v. Rowe, 324 Mo. 863, 24 S.W.2d 1032 (1930); State
v. Wilson, 321 Mo. 564, 12 S.W.2d 445 (1928); State v. Hubbard, 295 S.W. 788
(Mo. 1927); State v. Brazel, 270 S.W. 273 (Mo. 1925); State v. Carr, 256 S.W.
1043 (Mo. 1923); State v. Parker, 301 Mo. 294, 256 S.W. 1040 (1923); State v.
Cook, 207 S.W. 831 (Mo. 1918); State v. Dockery, 243 Mo. 592, 147 S.W. 976
(1912). Contra, State v. Taylor, 118 Mo. 153, 24 S.W. 449 (1893).
109. State v. Bobbitt, 228 Mo. 252, 128 S.W. 953 (1910) ; State v. Fox, 148 Mo.
517, 50 S.W. 98 (1899) ; State v. Taylor, 118 Mo. 153, 24 S.W. 449 (1893) ; State
v. Lewis, 69 Mo. 92 (1878).
110. State v. Hutchin, 353 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1962).
111. State v. Rhoden, 243 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1951) ; State v. Conrad, 322 Mo. 246,
14 S.W.2d 608 (1938); State v. Brown, 62 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1933). However, in
State v. Harris, 232 Mo. 317, 134 S.W. 535 (1911), the court refused to decide if
the instruction in question was collateral or law of the case. The state had re-
quested and the court had given an instruction on flight but did not include a
reference to defendant's explanation. The court reversed on the theory that,
while the instruction may not have been required unless requested by defendant
absent the instruction on behalf of the state, once the court undertakes to instruct
the jury on the state's side, then it becomes the duty of the court to give a full
instruction presenting both sides of a proposition if it has two. See also State v.
Sparks, 195 S.W. 1031 (Mo. 1917).
Westhues, J., has suggested eliminating this instruction entirely:
Instructions on the above subjects [incriminating statements of defendant
and evidentiary effect of possession of recently stolen property] have been
held erroneous because they have been considered comments on the evidence
and as invading the province of the jury. In my humble opinion instructions
on flight should be placed in the same class. It seems to me that an instruc-
tion on flight, no matter how worded, calls the jury's attention to this par-
ticular evidence and gives it emphasis. Westhues, Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, 14 Mo. BA. J. 103, 104 (1943).
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of the case. Therefore, it seems clear that if a rule of evidence is
involved, the instruction will not be law of the case. But the line of
demarcation between what is collateral and what is cautionary is
obscure. That problem is discussed in a following section.
C. DUTY TO INSTRUCT UPON CORRECT REQUEST--"'CONVERSE"
It is clear that the trial court will not be charged with error in
failing to give on its own motion instructions converse to those given
on behalf of the state, 11' but the effect of a request varies. It has
been consistently held that the trial court may refuse to give an in-
struction converse to the state's if the instruction submitted by the
defendant is incorrect." When the defendant has correctly requested
such an instruction, he still may not have a right to have the instruc-
tion delivered. This results from the nature of converse instructions:
they do not designate a specific category of issues, such as self-defense
or the effect of impeaching testimony, as do the other instructions dis-
cussed in this note. Potentially they encompass all such categories.
Therefore, it is not surprising to find the Supreme Court differentiat-
ing the effect of a correct request for a converse instruction on the
basis of the issue involved. Thus, the court has ruled that even if cor-
rect, the instruction need not be given if it is converse to a state in-
struction which has been designated "cautionary""' or "collateral,"'1 5
but must be given only when converse to the state's main or law of the
case instruction." 6
A trial court need not give any instruction requested by the de-
fendant when the issue has been covered in other instructions. In
112. State v. Harris, 356 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1962); State v. Worley, 353 S.W.2d
589 (Mo. 1962); State v. Nasello, 325 Mo. 442, 30 S.W.2d 132 (1930); State v.
Cardwell, 312 Mo. 140, 279 S.W. 99 (1925); State v. Gurnee, 309 Mo. 6, 274 S.W.
58 (1925) ; State v. Dougherty, 287 Mo. 82, 228 S.W. 786 (1921).
113. State v. Washington, 357 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1962); State v. Van Horn, 288
S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1956) ; State v. Bradley, 361 Mo. 267, 234, S.W.2d 556 (1950);
State v. Hicks, 353 Mo. 950, 185 S.W.2d 650 (1945).
114. State v. McWilliams, 331 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1960) (dictum).
115. State v. Worten, 263 S.W. 124 (Mo. 1924). See also State v. Ledbetter,
332 Mo. 225, 58 S.W.2d 453 (1933) where the court pointed out that the issue
involved in Worten was collateral.
116. State v. McWilliams, 331 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1960); State v. Quinn, 344 Mo.
1072, 130 S.W.2d 511 (1939) ; State v. Fraley, 342 Mo. 442, 116 S.W.2d 17 (1938) ;
State v. Gillum, 336 Mo. 69, 77 S.W.2d 110 (1934); State v. Shields, 296 Mo. 389,
246 S.W. 932 (1922) ; State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922) ; State v. Cantrell,
290 Mo. 232, 234 S.W. 800 (1921) ; State v. Johnson, 234 S.W. 794 (Mo. 1921) ;
State v. Dougherty, 287 Mo. 82, 228 S.W. 786 (1921); State v. Levitt, 278 Mo.
372, 213 S.W. 108 (1919); State v. Harris, 232 Mo. 317, 134 S.W. 535 (1911);
State v. Rutherford, 152 Mo. 124, 53 S.W. 417 (1899); State v. Fredericks, 136
Mo. 51, 37 S.W. 832 (1896); State v. Jackson, 126 Mo. 521, 29 S.W. 601 (1895).
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State v. Fraley,117 the court overruled cases which had held that, by
concluding its main instructions with the words "and unless you so
find you will acquit the defendant," the state precluded the defendant
from getting a converse instruction on that issue. The court held:
[T]hat in all criminal cases, if a defendant offers a correct in-
struction as the converse of the State's main instructions, it
should be given, unless fully and fairly covered by other instruc-
tions. We rule that the practice of concluding the State's main in-
struction with the following words "and unless you so find you
will acquit," or words of like import, is not a sufficient reason for
refusing a correct converse instruction offered by the defen-
dant.1"8
Alibi presents a special problem in this category. With slight ex-
ception" 9 this issue has been treated as collateral.1 20 The court said
in Chaney that trial courts had a duty to instruct on those matters set
out in State v. Bounds' 2 if the defendant so requested whether cor-
rectly or not. One of those subjects was alibi.122 However, the court
recently said in State v. Hutchin: 23
It has been ruled that "an instruction on alibi constitutes no part
of the state's case"; and that "it is not a question of law upon
which the court is required to instruct" as part of the law of the
case because "an instruction on alibi is the converse of the state's
main instruction in so far as such main instruction requires
the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime"; and, there-
fore, the rule concerning converse instructions should apply.12'
State v. Pope,125 relied upon by Hutchin, was perhaps the only case
that ever so held. The court was right in pointing out that the issue
did not involve the law of the case; no case had held it did for many
years.12 6 But, as noted, alibi instructions had generally been treated
117. 342 Mo. 442, 116 S.W.2d 17 (1938). See also State v. Chevlin, 284 S.W.2d
563 (Mo. 1955).
118. Id. at 447, 116 S.W.2d at 20. But see State v. Washington, 357 S.W.2d
92 (Mo. 1962). It appears that one of defendant's two requested converse instruc-
tions was correct, but the court refused to reverse on that ground because of the
exculpatory clause included in the state's principal instructions.
119. State v. Pope, 338 Mo. 919, 92 S.W.2d 904 (1936). See also State v. Worten,
263 S.W. 124 (Mo. 1924) as explained by State v. Ledbetter, 332 Mo. 225, 58
S.W.2d 453 (1933).
120. State v. Trice, 338 Mo. 744, 92 S.W.2d 135 (1936) ; State v. Bobbitt, 228
Mo. 252, 128 S.W. 953 (1910); State v. Koplan, 167 Mo. 298, 66 S.W. 967 (1902) ;
State v. Fox, 148 Mo. 517, 50 S.W. 98 (1899); State v. Lewis, 69 Mo. 92 (1878).
121. 305 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1957).
122. Id. at 491.
123. 353 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1962).
124. Id. at 704.
125. 338 Mo. 919, 92 S.W.2d 904 (1936).
126. Some very early cases so held. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 118 Mo. 153, 24
S.W. 449 (1893).
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as collateral, for which an erroneous request would suffice under
Chaney. Under this new rule, only a correct request will place the
court under a duty to instruct on alibi.
The theory which underlies treating alibi as a converse instruction
is sound. Insofar as the state's ease requires the presence of the ac-
cused at the scene of the crime-i.e., when conspiracy or a similar
theory is not relied upon-it is an element on which the state has the
burden of proof. It constitutes part of the law of the case upon which
the state must instruct in any event or suffer reversal of a conviction.
In terms of trying to maximize the information available to the jury,
then, the goal is reached by placing the entire risk of error for failure
to instruct on the state, and very little in defendant's favor would
be added by applying "collateral" rules to a converse instruction.
Indeed, this reasoning applies to all converse instructions because, as
noted above, only those converse instructions which pertain to a state
instruction which is law of the case ever need be given by the trial
court.
D. No DUTY TO INSTRUCT-"CAUTIONARY."
In Chaney, the court said that "giving purely cautionary instruc-
tions, which may be discretionary with the court, should require the
offer of a correct instruction.. . ." If that statement is interpreted to
mean that an instruction from the cautionary class must be given
if it is correctly requested, but need not be given if erroneously re-
quested, then it appears that no such class exists. To prove the
existence of such a group, there should be cases involving the same
instruction when error was predicated on the failure to instruct when
the instruction was correctly requested, and refusal to reverse when
erroneously requested. Only the contrary is found. Soon after Chaney
the court held that a definition of "check" was "inappropriate" even
though the request was correct. 12 7
Unless this class of instructions is really composed of two different
groups, only one of the following rules could apply: (1) either the
court has absolute discretion whether to instruct, or (2) it may be
placed under a duty to do so by a correct instruction. It seems likely
that a great deal of the confusion was caused by the court relying on
the fact that an instruction was not requested, or was erroneously
requested, instead of saying that there was absolute discretion whether
to instruct. For example, in State v. Brown,12 the defendant com-
plained on appeal that the court did not instruct the jury not to "en-
127. State v. Gillman, 354 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1962) ("would be cautionary in
nature and discretionary on the part of the trial court." Id. at 853).
128. 360 S.W.2d 618, 621 (1962).
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gage in or be swayed by guess, speculation, conjecture or suspicion, no
matter how strong their suspicion might have been in arriving at their
verdict." The court called this a collateral matter, and said that the
court did not have to instruct on such an issue on its own motion.
However, several years earlier the court had decided State v. Hino-
josa,129 in which the trial court had been correctly requested to warn
the jury generally not to let their sympathies interfere with their
judgment. If the court had called this collateral, as it did in Brown,
reversal would have been necessary; the rule even prior to Chaney
called for reversal for failure to instruct on collateral matters if the
requested instruction was correct. The court in Iinojosa said, how-
ever, the question was purely within the discretion of the court. In
short, no case has been found in which an instruction of this sort has
been called collateral when to do so would require reversal.
Some cautionary instructions are generically different from those
in the collateral class, such as an instruction that rape is easy to
allege but difficult to defend. 30 Others, however, are clearly questions
of evidence, such as an instruction that the prosecutor's opening re-
marks are not evidence.131 Thus, some instructions which the court
has placed in the cautionary class state rules relating to the use of
evidence. These cautionary instructions are not readily discernable
from those classed as collateral.
It would make more sense to define the cautionary class as being
composed of instructions the giving of which is always within the
trial judge's discretion, unaffected by whether a request for the in-
struction has been made, and by whether, if made, the request was
correct. Those instructions on issues which the court considers so
trivial that the defendant could not have been prejudiced by an omis-
sion to instruct on them would constitute the class of cautionary in-
structions. The court could then refuse to reverse either on the
ground that failure to instruct was not prejudicial error,3 2 or simply
because the instruction was classed as cautionary. These would
amount to the same thing.
129. 242 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1951).
130. State v. Lindsey, 80 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1935). The court said that this
alleged error related to a collateral matter. But calling it collateral there did not
give rise to a reversal since it had not been requested at all. The question remains
whether the court would have called it collateral if there had been such a request.
131. State v. Lindsey, 333 Mo. 139, 62 S.W.2d 420 (1933).
132. Some support for this is found in State v. Henderson, 186 Mo. 473, 85 S.W.
576 (1905). The court there said that the giving of cautionary instructions de-
pends upon the facts adduced on trial, and relied on the doctrine of non-prejudicial
error in refusing to reverse.
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E. DEFINITIONS.
The category of definition instructions is not generically the same
as the preceding four categories. An instruction in this area may
involve the definition of a word or phrase which is in one of the
above categories. Thus, the court may be asked to define for the jury
a phrase such as "heat of passion," which might be an element of a
lesser included offense to murder. As such, it would involve the law
of the case. Examples may similarly be found in the collateral ("im-
peach"), and cautionary ("check") categories, though probably this
would not arise in the converse group of instructions.
Perhaps for this reason the court has created two different verbal
formulae for handling these instructions. In some instances the word
or phrase in question is called law of the case and hence must be de-
fined without request. But most cases draw the distinction between
technical words and words of common usage.133 The latter approach
is the more common. T" It is also conceivable that in most instances
the two amount to the same thing: "technical" words that must be
defined are generally words which constitute part of the law of the
case. But the groups are not coterminous. If a word constitutes part
of the law of the case but is a word of common understanding, it
probably need not be defined. The word "voluntary" is an example.
Similarly, the court has required definition of "corroborative," a
"technical" word, which, however, is xiot part of the law of the case
under the present rule.
The court reversed for failure to define, in the absence of any re-
133. The court in State v. LaMance, 348 Mo. 484, 154 S.W.2d 110 (1941),
seemed to rely on both of these dichotomies in reversing for failure to define
"premeditatedly," "malice aforethought" and "deliberation," even though the de-
fense had made no request for such instructions. At one point the court relied
upon the statute:
[I]t is the duty of a trial court to instruct a jury in writing upon all ques-
tions of law arising in the case which are necessary for their information in
giving their verdict. We are of the opinion that under the statute it was the
duty of the trial court to define the words .... Id. at 500, 154 S.W.2d at 119.
But later in the opinion the court seemed to rely primarily on the technicality of
the word. Referring to the words "transporting" and "intoxicated condition," the
court said that such words were held not to have technical significance and to be
of such common use that a jury would readily understand their meaning, but that
the words involved here have "special significance in defining the crime of
murder." This case is used illustratively since it uses both theories to support
the same result. This is not the usual approach; most cases rely upon one or
the other.
134. There is some indication that the technical word approach is the only one
in use now. In State v. Holmes, 364 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Mo. 1963) the court said:
"The rule is that words in common use need not be defined for the jury," and
included "intent" within that rule. Contra, State v. Gillman, 354 S.W.2d 843 (Mo.
1962). See note 127 supra.
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quest, the following terms: "premeditatedly,' 13 5  "malice afore-
thought,"'' 18 "deliberation,"' 37 "in the heat of passion," 38 and "cor-
roborative." 3 9
The following words and phrases do not have to be defined:140
"accomplice, 1 4 1 "credible evidence," 42 "feloniously,'' 1 43 "good re-
pute," " "voluntary,"'' 5 "cohabit,"' 46 "intent,"'147 "provoked the diffi-
culty or began the quarrel,"' 48 "improper conduct,'1 40 "goods, wares,
and merchandise,"5  "other valuable thing, kept and deposited,""'
"self-defense,'1 52 "bring on the difficulty,' 5 3 "justifiable,"'" "de-
signedly," 55 "heat of passion."'' 5  In none of these cases does the
court say whether the defendant requested the instruction.
When a request, correct or erroneous, is involved, the results vary.
It was held to be error in State v. Reed 15 7 to fail to correct and de-
135. State v. LaMance, 348 Mo. 484, 154 S.W.2d 110 (1941).
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. State v. Strong, 153 Mo. 548, 55 S.W. 78 (1900). Contra, State v. Rose,
142 Mo. 418, 44 S.W. 329 (1898).
139. State v. Hunter, 181 Mo. 316, 80 S.W. 955 (1904).
140. Those words used unnecessarily in the instructions need not be defined.
See, e.g., State v. Daly, 210 Mo. 664, 109 S.W. 53 (1908) which held that "malice
aforethought," "premeditation" and "corroboration" did not have to be defined
since they were not elements of the offense when the theory of prosecution is the
felony-murder rule. It would seem to be arguable from cases of this type, com-
bined with the technical word rule, that perhaps the court is actually requiring
both: (1) part of the law of the case; and (2) technical meaning not of common
understanding.
141. State v. Gridley, 353 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1962).
142. State v. Thresher, 350 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961).
143. State v. Cantlin, 118 Mo. 100, 23 S.W. 1091 (1893).
144. State v. Walker, 232 Mo. 252, 134 S.W. 516 (1911).
145. State v. Garrett, 285 Mo. 279, 226 S.W. 4 (1920) ("purely collateral or
incidental").
146. State v. Knost, 207 Mo. 18, 105 S.W. 616 (1907) ("this is a word in
general use, in no sense a word of art, and it is only a fair presumption that the
jury fully understood the word in its usual and ordinary acceptation").
147. State v. Holmes, 364 S.W.2d 537 (1963).
148. State v. Long, 201 Mo. 664, 100 S.W. 587 (1907).
149. State v. Barrington, 198 Mo. 23, 95 S.W. 235 (1906) ("has no technical
meaning").
150. State v. McGuire, 193 Mo. 215, 91 S.W. 939 (1906).
151. Ibid.
152. State v. Bailey, 190 Mo. 257, 88 S.W. 733 (1905) ("self-explanatory").
153. Ibid.
154. State v. Jacobs, 152 Mo. 565, 54 S.W. 441 (1899).
155. State v. Smith, 299 Mo. 269, 252 S.W. 662 (1923) ("not used in a technical
sense").
156. State v. Reed, 154 Mo. 122, 55 S.W. 278 (1900).
157. Ibid.
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liver an instruction defining "in the heat of passion" and "upon a
sudden provocation." However, the court held in a recent case 58
that the trial court need not give an instruction defining the word
"check" in a prosecution for forgery of a check, even though the in-
struction as requested was correct. The court said:
[S] uch an instruction would be cautionary in nature and discre-
tionary on the part of the trial court. In the Chaney case ... it
was expressly held that the giving of a cautionary instruction
"should require the offer of a correct instruction," and while the
requested instruction in this case as worded may correctly state
an abstract principle of law it is inappropriate under the facts of
this case and under the theory of the State as submitted in the
instructions. No prejudicial error resulted in refusing the offered
instruction .... 1-9
It is difficult to determine exactly why the court thought the instruc-
tion would be "inappropriate." In State v. Garrett,60 the court did
not say whether the request was correct or not; probably the de-
fense merely asked that the word "deliberately" be defined. The court
refused, and the case was reversed on that point.
Some cases superficially appear to be inconsistent with each other
and with the theory set out in the first part of this section. Thus,
for example, one case was reversed for failure to define "corrobora-
tive" ' 1 while another refused to reverse for failure to define "cor-
roboration. 162 But these cases can be distinguished on the charge
involved in each of them. In the former the charge was perjury, a
difficult case generally in proving the corpus delicti, while the latter
case involved a charge of first degree murder and the state's theory
was predicated on the felony-murder rule. Corroboration played an
indiscernable role in the proof of the state's case. On the other hand,
some results are inconsistent. The cases are divided on whether "heat
of passion" must be defined without a request. 6 3
III. CRITIQUE
The preceding sections have developed the rules the Missouri
Supreme Court has created within two problem areas: (1) the cate-
gories of instructions; and (2) the particular instructions which
158. State v. Gillman, 354 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1962).
159. Id. at 853.
160. 276 Mo. 302, 207 S.W. 784 (1918).
161. State v. Hunter, 181 Mo. 316, 80 S.W. 955 (1904).
162. State v. Daly, 210 Mo. 664, 109 S.W. 53 (1908). See also State v. Yates,
252 S.W. 641 (Mo. 1923); State v. Tedder, 294 Mo. 390, 242 S.W. 889 (1922);
State v. Affronti, 292 Mo. 53, 238 S.W. 106 (1922) ; State v. Sublett, 191 Mo. 163,
90 S.W. 374 (1905) (not requested).
163. See cases cited note 138 supra.
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should be included within each category. This section of the note is
a critical examination of the rules that have been developed in those
areas.
A. THE CATEGORIES.
Central to an analysis is an understanding of the raison d'tre of
the problem itself. That problem is best understood in terms of the
conflict between an ideal concept of the function of instructions vis-A
vis the practical administration of that ideal.1"4 The court has at-
164. With rare exception the only function assigned to instructions is to inform
the jury of the applicable law on the facts presented at the trial. The following
is a typical approach taken by standard treatises on the subject:
The sole function of instructions is to convey to the minds of the jury the
correct legal principles that are to govern them in weighing the evidence
presented to them, in order that upon their determination of the facts from
the evidence they may apply the correct principles of law and thereby
decide corretcly and justly .... 1 REID'S BRANSON INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
1 (3d ed. 1936).
See also 1 BLASEFELD, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 4 (2d ed. 1916); FMRis &
RossKoPF, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 1 (1916); 5 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 2090 (12th ed. 1957). Ideally, the jury's role in this process is to
apply to the facts the legal principles given to it by the court. Just as the appel-
late court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., the facts presented upon
which the jury reaches its determination, so the appellate court must review, in a
sense, the sufficiency of the law which has been presented to the jury by the
court. The difference is that from the facts presented to the jury, other facts are
deducible and the question presented in a sufficiency of the evidence situation is
how far the court will allow the jury to go in making such deductions. But the
jury can make no such deductions from the law which is presented to it in
instructions.
Two other functions are seldom adverted to by writers, with the notable excep-
tion of Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE
L.J. 194 (1932). Those functions are control of the jury and control of the law
applied at the trial. The functions of controlling the jury operate at both the
trial court and appellate court levels. While the primary thrust of this function-
the peremptory instruction directing a verdict-relates primarily to civil cases, it
is also applicable to criminal trials. It is commonly assumed that the jury does
in fact follow the instructions given to it and it is rare in a criminal case for this
function to actually come into play.
Thus, for example, many years prior to the enactment of the statute under
discussion, the Missouri Supreme Court said, in Hardy v. State, 7 Mo. 607 (1842):
[It is the duty of the jury to respect the instructions of the court as to the
law of the case, and to find the prisoner guilty or not guilty according to the
law as delivered to them by the court, and the evidence, as they receive it
from the witnesses, under the direction of the court. Id. at 609.
See also Malinsky v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) where
the court said that it must be assumed and presumed that juries follow instruc-
tions.
Further evidence of the fact that informing the jury of the applicable law is
not the only function of instructions may be obtained from those civil cases where
the case is not tried to a jury, but to a judge alone. In Harbison v. School Dist.
No. 1, 89 Mo. 184, 1 S.W. 30 (1886), e.g., there is advertence to the right of the
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tempted to formulate rules that will provide juries with the maximum
amount of information about pertinent rules of law, but which will
not result in an undue number of reversals. 165
party to have the court declare the principles of law which the court applies in
the case. Obviously, the function here is primarily to allow adequate review of
the decision.
Finally, instructions may be used as one of the vehicles by which the law
applied in criminal trials may be shaped by appellate courts. The vacillation in
Missouri cases on the effect of possession of recently stolen goods may be cited
as a clear example of this function in action. For many years, the Missouri rule
was that exclusive possession by the defendant of recently stolen property gives
rise to a presumption of guilt, rebuttable by the defendant. In State v. Swarens,
294 Mo. 139, 241 S.W. 934 (1922), the court changed this rule by reversing on
an instruction which had stated the prior rule. Because the court desired a change
in the rule, the instruction was erroneous even though it was in accord with previ-
ous cases. See also Westhues, Criminal Law and Procedure, 14 Mo. BAR J. 103
(1943).
While it is clear that these functions developed at various times during the
evolution of the jury system, the exact history of instructions is as obscure as is
the origins of the jury itself. Farley, op. cit. supra; Sokilov, The Judge's Charge
to the Jury in Criminal Cases, 10 CAN. BAR REv. 228 (1932). It is not within the
ambit of this note to explore that history and mention is made of this dual origin
only to point up the fact that there is historically more than one function in-
volved in their usage.
165. The rules relating to the giving of instructions may be used by a defense
attorney to lay a foundation in the record to allow reversal in the event that the
defendant is found guilty. Thus, the defendant, if the strategy is correct, will
either be found not guilty, or, if found guilty, the conviction will be reversed on
the basis of the error committed by the trial court. Consider, for example, the
situation presented in State v. Wright, 352 Mo. 66, 175 S.W.2d 866 (1943).
Defendant was accused and found guilty of first degree murder. Immediately
after his arrest, he had given an account of the fight which suggested a defense
of self-defense despite an admission that the defendant may have been the first
to commit an assault. The state introduced that admission into evidence. On trial,
however, the defendant told a different story; he denied that he had killed the
deceased, and admitted only that they had had a fight.
From the point of view of the defendant, it is possible that he would not request
an instruction on self-defense: (1) it would be inconsistent with the defendant's
own testimony; (2) the case would be reversed in the event of a verdict of guilty
if the trial court did not instruct since it is law of the case. It is equally certain
that the prosecution in that situation would not ask for a self-defense instruction.
Thus, it falls upon the court to undertake on its own motion to instruct on self-
defense. The trial court in Wright, supra, failed to do so and the conviction was
reversed.
While it may be clear in that case that the defense attorney did not himself
create the trap for the trial court, nonetheless the facts of the case itself did
present one. In other cases it is less clear that the defense counsel could not
avoid such a trap. He may be in a position to force the trial court to make a
decision which makes no difference to his case but nonetheless would cause
reversal if the court makes an error.
Cases of this sort probably more often arise as a result of an instruction sub-
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Logically, there are three ways in which this conflict could be re-
solved, expressed in terms of defense participation in the decision
whether to instruct: (1) no request necessary; (2) request always
necessary; (3) request necessary with respect to some instructions
but not to others. However, the selection of any one of these rules as
the most desirable, still is based upon the assumption that it is
necessary or desirable to have a predetermined set of rules to facili-
tate administration. The contrary approach may be more desirable
and has, indeed, been substantially adopted by the federal courts.160
mitted to the court which incorrectly states the substantive law in favor of the
accused. If the instruction is given as requested, the defendant gains an advan-
tage with the jury; if it is refused and a correct one on that point is not given,
it may result in a reversal; and finally, if the trial court undertakes to correct it,
he runs the risk of making an error in the substantive law.
The defense counsel may be tempted to trap the trial court in these tvo areas:
(1) by not requesting an instruction at all where not to give it would be reversible
error, e.g., self-defense; or (2) to request an erroneous instruction with the three
possible ramifications just discussed. Thus, a defense counsel operating under a
thesis partly contrary to the general assumption that the instructions are actually
meaningful in the deliberations of a jury gains a considerable advantage by rules
relating to the giving of instructions.
166. Two rules govern the giving of instructions in the federal system. FED.
R. CRIm. P. 30 provides that "No party may assign as error any.., omission...
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." FED.
R. CRiim. P. 52(b) says in substance that plain errors or defects affecting sub-
stantial rights of the accused may be noticed on appeal although not brought to
the attention of the court. These two rules have been considered in pan materia.
See, e.g., Lash v. United States, 221 F.2d 237 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
826 (1955). The holdings under them have generally been much less lenient on
the defense than have Missouri cases. For example, it has been held that refusal
to charge may be regarded as reversible error only if the tendered instruction is
correct, not substantially covered in the main charge and is on such a vital point
in the case that the failure to give it would deprive defendant of a defense or
seriously impair its effective presentation. Phelps v. United States, 252 F.2d 49
(5th Cir. 1958).
The conflict in the federal system has been analyzed as follows:
The two Rules quoted above [30 and 52(b)] impinge upon one another
but do not actually conflict. The Rule requiring objection to the charge
before the jury retires is a salutary one in that it affords an opportunity for
the prompt correction of inadvertent misstatements, oversights, omissions,
or even erroneous statements of law, which if not corrected at the time
would necessitate a new trial after an appeal with consequent delay and
expense to the defendant and to the public. Furthermore, the Rule prevents
a defendant from sitting silently by when he is aware of an error in the
charge perhaps more technical than seriously prejudicial, which could and
undoubtedly would be corrected on the spot if brought to the court's atten-
tion, to the end that in the event of an adverse verdict, he would have good
grounds for a new trial with the chance of a favorable verdict from anotherjury. On the other hand, should the Rule be rigidly applied, appellate courts
would be powerless to correct grave miscarriages of justice resulting from
serious errors in the charge whenever a defendant or his counsel through
ignorance, inadvertence, or inexperience failed to object before the jury re-
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Thus, the decision whether to reverse for failure to instruct may be
made on an ad hoc basis, by utilization of the doctrine of non-prejudi-
cial error, without formulating in advance rules for the implementa-
tion of that doctrine in order to provide predictability.
Rather than rely solely upon the doctrine of non-prejudicial error,
the Missouri Supreme Court has divided the instructions into cate-
gories with differing legal results following from inclusion in one cate-
gory or the other. In effect, those categories consist of a predeter-
mination by the court of what degree of prejudice is involved in the
omission of one of the class of instructions. Also implicit in the cate-
gories approach is the rejection of a rule that no request is ever
necessary, or that a request is always needed. The rejection is pred-
icated on the concept of burden, the same reason justifying the di-
,vision of responsibility for the giving of collateral and converse in-
structions between the court and the defense.
Adopting the rule that the court must instruct on all issues in the
case, whether requested or not, would assure that the jury receives
tired to consider its verdict. Therefore, appellate courts will take notice of
errors asserted by counsel for the first time on appeal, and also notice errors
sua sponte, when in their discretion notice of the error is necessary to pre-
vent an injustice. Lash v. United States, 321 F.2d 237, 240 (1st Cir. 1955).
Thus, the federal cases, while acknowledging the issue in substantially the
same terms as the Missouri cases, offer no real analysis of the criteria which
should be considered in determining how the conflict should be resolved. The
federal resolution does, however, seem to place more confidence in the defense
attorney's competence and thereby assumes that he will in fact call the court's
attention to any omission. The number of cases in that system involving the same
issue would seem to cast some doubt on that assumption.
See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) (where jury has been
properly instructed on reasonable doubt, instruction on circumstantial evidence
should be refused) ; Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (not reversible
error to limit use of co-conspirator's evidence) ; Berry v. United States, 271 F.2d
775 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960) (not error to fail to limit
use of evidence in absence of any objection by defendant). But see Weiler v.
United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945) (reversed for failure of trial court to instruct
that defendant could not be convicted by less than two witnesses for perjury,
refusing to apply harmless error doctrine); Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287
(1939) (reversed for failure to give defendant requested instruction on his right
not to testify under federal constitution and federal statute which says that no
presumption shall arise from such refusal to testify).
The Final Report of the Senate Criminal Law Revision Committee to the Senate
of the State of Missouri Sixty-seventh General Assembly, vol. 1, appendix II:
Recommendations of the Missouri Crime Survey of 1926 with Notations of any
action Taken Thereon to Date, p. 5 said: "3. Amend statute relating to instruc-
tions in criminal cases so as to require Defendant's counsel to point out any errors
in form or substance of the instructions immediately after they are read to the
jury." This would make the Missouri rule essentially the same a FED. R. CRM,.
P. 31.
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the maximum information about the applicable law, for the trial
judge would be under the duty to instruct on all possible issues raised
by the evidence. This rule, however, would impose several burdens
on the trial court: (1) the trial judge would have to recall which
issues are supported by some evidence, and determine whether that
evidence is sufficient; (2) he would have to formulate a correct state-
ment of the law on that issue; (3) the probability of error and re-
versal due to omission to instruct as well as to misdirection would
increase; (4) that trial judge, or another judge in the same circuit,
might be required to re-try the case in the event the prosecutor re-
commences prosecution."6
If, on the other hand, the court adopted a rule which placed the
trial court under no duty to instruct at all except upon request, those
burdens would be substantially reduced or eliminated. However, it is
not unlikely that the goal of maximization of information on the law
to the jury would be seriously jeopardized. Further, if this rule were
to include the requirement for a correct request, the burden on the
trial court would be further reduced with a concomitant increase in
the probability that the jury would not be informed of all the law in
the case.
Missouri, of course, has taken a middle ground: some instructions
must be given whether requested or not, some need be only errone-
ously requested, others must be correctly requested, and some do not
have to be given in any event. The court impliedly perceives a de-
scending amount of prejudicial error potentially present in the omis-
sion to instruct in those various categories and has correspondingly
required ascending participation of the defense, manifested by a re-
quest. It has, therefore, in the collateral and converse categories,
167. With the exception of the last "burden" the Supreme Court adverted to
these problems in the Chaney case:
As to any question collateral to the main issue, it is reasonable and logical
to require submission of an instruction on the subject by counsel for defen-dant who has prepared and conducted the defense. Otherwise, too great aburden would be placed on the trial judge by requiring him to try to think
of all possible collateral issues and prepare instructions on them. The duty
rests on counsel for the defendant to aid and not ambush the court....
However, once the question is thus called to the court's attention, it is impos-
ing no undue burden on the court to give the instruction on it as requested
or if not correctly stated to modify the instruction to correctly submit thequestion. Fairness to the defendant, who may not be able to employ counsel
of his own choice, would seem to require the court to do this. However, thedefendant should not be permitted to take advantage of the trial judge by
making no request that the jury be instructed on a collateral issue, thereby
concealing any interest in it, and thereafter seeking to profit by raising on
appeal the court's failure to give an instruction on such a question. Undoubt-
edly these are the considerations upon which the established rule is based and
we believe them to be sound. State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238, 245 (Mo.
1961).
The burden on the system caused by new trials was impliedly recognized in the
opinion, however, for the case itself was reversed and remanded for new trial.
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placed upon the defense the determination of what is necessary for the
information of the jury in that particular case with respect to that
issue. Viewed in this way, the categories are a predetermination by
the court of the likelihood of prejudice resulting from an omission.
Those issues included in law of the case are predetermined to be
prejudicial to the accused if not instructed upon; those in the caution-
ary class are never prejudicial; and those in the collateral and con-
verse categories are left for the judgment of the defense counsel in
individual cases.
B. THE ISSUES WITHIN THE CATEGORIES.
The problem remains, conceding the validity of the categories, are
the right results reached in determining which instructions belong
to which category? In large part, the answer depends upon the
critic's view of the amount of prejudice inherent in the failure to
instruct on any particular issue. Criteria for an objective analysis
are lacking, except for analogies one may draw from issues con-
sistently placed in one category or another. Such reasoning, however,
begs the question. At most it could result in logical consistency; it
still would not provide an answer. Insofar as the case law allowed,
those problems were discussed in the section involved.
C. A SUGGESTED MODIFICATION IN THE CURRENT RULE.
The amount of litigation in this relatively narrow area of criminal
procedural law has been vast. There is no indication that it is be-
coming smaller. Unless the strain on the judicial system caused by
this litigation is to be allowed to continue, a change in the rules
alleviating the present situation would seem to be in order. For this
reason, the following proposal is made.
It is suggested that the Missouri rule relating to the giving of in-
structions in felony cases be modified to provide: (1) the trial court
must instruct upon the law of the case whether requested or not; (2)
the trial court must instruct on all other matters put into issue by the
evidence, or by presumptions of law, if the defense submits a draft
of the instruction along with a request that it be given; if the sub-
mitted draft is incorrect, the trial court must correct it.
This modification of the apparent existing rule is based upon the
following considerations:
(1) The rule would be greatly simplified, consisting of only two
categories, which would reduce the chance of error for omissions of
instructions.
(2) The effect of being placed in the cautionary category, whether
an instruction must be given if correctly requested, is not clear, and
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clarification would require litigation. The suggested rule would
abolish the necessity for that litigation by requiring that the instruc-
tion be given if erroneously requested.
(3) It was suggested earlier that criteria could not readily be de-
veloped for determining what particular instructions should be
placed in one category or another under the present rules. This un-
doubtedly is due to the fact that there is little logical distinction be-
tween the collateral and cautionary categories. Absorption of the
latter category would resolve this problem without the need for exten-
sive litigation. Such litigation has not proved itself in the past to
be very productive of certainty and reasonableness in the law.
(4) The jury would be better informed on the applicable law than
it is under the present rules since the trial court could no longer, for
example, refuse with impunity to inform the jury that the prosecu-
tor's remarks are not evidence, a "cautionary" instruction.
(5) In terms of burden, the rationale relied upon in Chaney for
the division of instructions into categories, the only additional bur-
den placed on the trial court would be the duty to correct the instruc-
tion if it were not already correct in substance. And Chaney itself
added this burden on the trial courts with respect to collateral
issues.1a The rule suggested would add but little more. Further,
this additional burden must be balanced against many advantages to
be gained by the rule, inter alia, lessening the burden on the entire
system including the Supreme Court.
In summary, the rule would save a large amount of litigation and
retrial of cases, and would better inform the jury. These considera-
tions are balanced only against the added burden of trial courts of
correcting converse and cautionary instructions. Further, it is not
unreasonable to expect the trial court or the prosecutor to have on
hand model instructions which easily could be substituted for those
submitted which are substantively wrong.6 9
168. Respondent admits that at present the cases are in conflict on the ques-
tion of the court's duty to correct and give erroneous collateral instructions
presented by counsel. One view is expressed by State v. Sanders, . . . and
State v. Lee . . . which hold to the theory that the court need not give
instructions on collateral matters unless defendant tenders a correct instruc-
tion. The other view supported by such cases as State v. Warren . . . and
State v. McNamara... wherein the doctrine stated is that where defendant
offers an erroneous instruction on a collateral matter involved in a case, the
court is under a duty to formulate and give a correct instruction.
Respondent respectfully submits, however, that the solution in resolving
this conflict is not to be found in curtailing the discretion of the trial court
in ,regard to instructions involving collateral matters, and thereby imposing
an undue burden on the trial court, which has no limitations, but rather to
rest the responsibility where it correctly belongs, i.e., on the shoulders of the
defendant who necessarily creates the collateral matters involved ....Quoted from State's Supplemental Brief in State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238(Mo. 1961).
169. There has, however, occasionally been manifested considerable judicial
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But even within this frame work it may be expected that justice
would be better served in some cases if the rule suggested were not
rigidly applied. For the resolution of these problems, the court could
rely overtly on the doctrine of non-prejudicial error. For example,
suppose the trial court refuses a request that the jury be instructed
that a rape charge is hard to defend. Should the case be reversed?
The court could refuse to reverse because the defendant was not
prejudiced by the refusal. Thus, the system would consist of two
categories of instructions, 170 with the flexible rule of prejudicial error
impatience with claims for increased responsibility of trial judges in this area.
In State v. Hadley, 364 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. 1963), the defense contended that an
instruction on malicious mischief should have been given as a lesser included
offense in a charge of burglary second decree. The court rejected this and other
similar contentions on the grounds that (1) they were not actually lesser included
offenses; and (2) were not supported by the evidence. But the court further said:
Nor do we believe that a trial court should be required to search the criminal
statutes to find some offense which might possibly be included within the
offense charged, in order to give an instruction upon it of his own motion.
Defendant here declined to offer any instructions. This contention is denied.
Id. at 518.
The objection to increased responsibility of trial judges expressed in this opinion,
however, does not relate to the increased amount of work that the proposal would
place on the court. Under the rule suggested, the only increased work is the writ-
ing of correct instructions if the requested one is incorrect. It is true on the other
hand, that the court may have to rely on its own initiative in giving the instruc-
tion adverted to in the opinion because lesser included offenses are within the
category of law of the case. The suggested change in the rule would add no new
burden in those terms: the court must instruct on lesser included offenses under
the present rule and that part of the rule would not be changed.
The opinion's concern with the amount of burden placed on the court in the
law of the case category is apparently not shared by the whole court, and the
opinion quoted is the divisional opinion of Judge Eager who dissented in the
Chaney case. Furthermore it would not seem unduly hopeful to expect trial judges
to have knowledge of what offenses are lesser included offenses in various charges.
If Missouri statutes are in such a disorder that those lesser included offenses are
not readily ascertainable, then the defense faces the same problem. As between
the state and the defendant, there seems little question as to who should bear the
responsibility for the state of the codification of the law.
170. A bipartite division of instructions has been used in the area of definition
instructions. Principally, the court relies on the distinction between technical
vis-A-vis non-technical words and the result of being in one or the other of those
categories varies. That categorization could easily be adapted to the proposed
rule, technical words being treated as law of the case, and non-technical words
being treated as belonging to the other category. Thus, technical words would
have to be defined without request, and non-technical words would have to be
defined upon request, but only then. Most of the litigation in that area has been
because of the uncertainty of what constitutes a technical word. While there is
no easy solution to that problem, it may at least be noted that those problems do
not inhere in determining what constitutes law of the case since the number of
issues included in that category would be very limited under present case law.
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superimposed upon them, achieving both certainty and reasonableness
in the categories, while not at the same time being too rigid in ap-
plication. This solution is better than what apparently has been done
in the past. Rather than relying on the doctrine of non-prejudicial
error, the court has often shuttled a particular instruction from one
category to another to achieve the desired result. This method re-
sults in uncertainty in the law and consequent increase in litigation
on that question.
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